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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Janice G. Davidson and Robert M. Davidson, in their 
individual capacities and as trustees of certain trusts 
(collectively, the "Appellants"),1  appeal from a final decision 
of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey (the "District Court"). That decision, involving a 
securities class action lawsuit (the "class action"), held that 
Appellants, as a result of their failur e to opt out of the 
class, were subject to the class settlement, and could not 
further pursue arbitration in California of claims they 
brought against Appellee Cendant Corporation ("Cendant"). 
 
Appellants have presented this Court with thr ee issues 
on appeal. First, they assert that the District Court erred in 
holding that the class included them. Second, Appellants 
argue that the District Court abused its discr etion in failing 
to grant them an extension of time to opt out of the class. 
Finally, they contend that the District Court err ed in 
enjoining their arbitration claims and, in doing so, violated 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. S 1 et seq. (the "FAA"). 
After considering these arguments, we hold that the District 
Court did not err in finding that Appellants wer e members 
of the class and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
grant them an extension of time to opt out of the class. 
However, we hold that the District Court did err in 
enjoining, in its entirety, Appellants' arbitration. While 
Appellants are subject to the class settlement, and 
therefore are enjoined from pursuing any claims that fall 
within that settlement, they are not enjoined from 
pursuing, in arbitration, any claims that fall outside the 
settlement's scope. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
In 1982, Janice Davidson founded Davidson & 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Janice G. Davidson and Robert M. Davidson, solely in their individual 
capacities, are collectively referr ed to as the "Davidsons." 
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Associates, Inc. ("DAI"), an entity later incorporated in 
California in 1984. From 1984 until 1996, the Davidsons 
were officers and directors of DAI. In that capacity, they led 
the company as it developed, manufactured, published, and 
distributed educational and entertainment softwar e 
products for home and school use. The company derived its 
revenues from sales to software distributors, specialty 
software stores, computer superstor es and mass 
merchandisers in international markets, international 
catalog sales to schools and teachers, and thr ough 
technology licensing and software manufacturing. 
 
In April 1993, DAI issued an initial public of fering ("IPO"), 
selling 200 million shares of common stock at $13 per 
share. Thereafter, DAI listed its stock on NASDAQ. After the 
IPO, the Davidsons controlled approximately 70% of DAI's 
outstanding common stock, with a majority of that stock in 
various charitable and irrevocable trusts contr olled by the 
Davidsons as trustees.2 
 
Following the IPO, DAI received a number of unsolicited 
inquiries with respect to possible mergers, acquisitions, 
joint ventures, and direct investments. No initial inquiry 
resulted in a transaction. However, in June 1995, the 
Davidsons were approached by CUC Inter national, Inc. 
("CUC") in connection with its possible acquisition of DAI. 
Although the first round of negotiations ended without an 
agreement, the negotiations were r esumed in December 
1995 and continued until July 1996, when CUC acquir ed 
DAI through a merger and DAI became a subsidiary of 
CUC. 
 
In connection with the merger, DAI shar eholders received 
85/100 of a CUC share in exchange for each DAI share, as 
negotiated in part based on the market price of each 
company's shares. As a result, the Davidsons received 
1,259,634 shares of CUC common stock, and the trusts 
controlled by the Davidsons received 31,245,465 shares of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Davidsons claim to have controlled 78% of DAI's outstanding 
shares immediately after the IPO. Cendant alleges that, at the time DAI 
merged with CUC International, Inc. (later Cendant), the Davidsons 
controlled 71.3% of the outstanding DAI common shares (1.4% in each 
person's individual capacity and 68.5% in the various trusts). 
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CUC common stock. The merger agreement also contained 
an arbitration provision3 and a "bust out" provision.4 
 
Following the merger, the Davidsons became directors of 
CUC and officers and directors of CUC's DAI subsidiary. In 
addition, the DAI shares owned by the public were 
exchanged for common shares of CUC that could be 
immediately traded over the New York Stock Exchange 
("NYSE"). Appellants' shares, however , could not be 
immediately traded. Due to the number of shar es 
Appellants received, they were deemed affiliates of CUC and 
could not publicly trade their stock on the NYSE unless 
their shares were subsequently made part of a registered 
public offering separate from the DAI/CUC merger.5 
 
In January 1997, following several months of acrimony 
between CUC senior management and the Davidsons, CUC 
terminated them as corporate officers though they 
remained directors. In March 1997, Appellants served CUC 
with a demand for arbitration, asserting claims in 
connection with the DAI/CUC merger agr eement and 
specifically as to the Davidsons' employment 
responsibilities with CUC. In May 1997, Appellants and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The arbitration provision provided: 
 
        Any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or relating to 
this 
        Agreement or the breach hereof which cannot be settled by mutual 
        agreement . . . shall be finally settled by arbitration . . . . 
The parties 
        agree that this clause has been included to rapidly and 
        inexpensively resolve any disputes between them with respect to 
this 
        Agreement, and that this clause shall be gr ounds for dismissal of 
        any court action commenced by either party with r espect to this 
        Agreement, other than post-arbitration actions seeking to enforce 
an 
        arbitration award. 
4. The "bust out" provision per mitted DAI to terminate the merger 
agreement if CUC's average share price fell below $29 per share in a 
defined period in order to protect the bargained-for value to be received 
by the DAI shareholders. 
 
5. As discussed below, Appellants' shares were restricted pursuant to the 
Securities Act of 1933. See 17 C.F.R.S 230.145; infra note 16 and 
accompanying text. However, the restrictions could be easily 
circumvented. In fact, just four months after the merger, in October 
1996, Appellants sold more than twenty million of the shares they 
received in the DAI/CUC merger. 
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CUC entered into a settlement agreement (the "Settlement 
Agreement"), which provided, inter alia, for the Davidsons 
to receive options to purchase 1.6 million shares of CUC 
common stock6 in exchange for a r elease by Appellants and 
the Davidsons' resignation from all r emaining positions 
with CUC. The Settlement Agreement also contained an 
arbitration provision.7 
 
Thereafter, on December 18, 1997, CUC and HFS, Inc. 
("HFS") merged, with CUC as the surviving company. Upon 
completion of the merger the company became known as 
Cendant. 
 
After the close of the stock market on April 15, 1998, 
Cendant publicly disclosed that accounting and 
bookkeeping irregularities had occurred at CUC and that it 
would restate its earnings for 1997. This caused its stock 
value to plummet 46% and triggered several class action 
lawsuits on behalf of investors who purchased CUC or 
Cendant stock during 1997. In late August 1998, Cendant 
further disclosed that the irregular accounting activity 
dated back to 1995, and that in addition to the 1997 
restatement, new earnings would be r eleased for 1995 and 
1996. This second disclosure triggered several more 
lawsuits involving purchases of CUC securities during the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Interestingly, at oral argument Cendant conceded that these 1.6 
million options are not, and have never been, considered part of the 
class action. 
 
7. That provision stated: 
 
        Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this 
        Agreement or the Surviving Agreements and Rights, any 
        controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this 
        Agreement or any of the Surviving Agreements and Rights or the 
        breach hereof or thereof which cannot be settled by mutual 
        agreement shall be finally settled by binding arbitration in 
        accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act . .. . The parties 
agree 
        that this Section has been included to rapidly and inexpensively 
        resolve any disputes between them with r espect to this Agreement 
        or any of the Surviving Agreements and Rights, and that this 
        Section shall be grounds for dismissal of any court action 
        commenced by any party with respect to this Agr eement or any of 
        the Surviving Agreements and Rights, other than post-arbitration 
        actions seeking to enforce an arbitration awar d. 
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broader period of alleged fraud. This new time frame 
presumably included the time during which Appellants 
engaged in the merger transaction with CUC. In total, 
Cendant restated and reduced its pr e-tax operating income 
for the relevant periods by approximately $500 million. 
 
Between April and August 1998, at least sixty-four 
purported securities fraud class action lawsuits wer e filed 
as a result of the April 1998 disclosur e. By order of the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the"MDL Panel"), 
all Cendant cases relating to the accounting irregularities 
were transferred to the District of New Jersey. During the 
process to consolidate the class actions in the District of 
New Jersey, fifteen motions were filed for appointment as 
the lead plaintiff. On May 29, 1998, the District Court 
consolidated all of the accounting irregularity actions 
pending against Cendant under the caption In r e Cendant 
Corporation Securities Litigation.8  On September 8, 1998, 
the District Court appointed the California Public 
Employees' Retirement System, the New Y ork State 
Common Retirement Fund, and the New York City Pension 
Funds, all public investment funds, as lead plaintif fs 
(collectively, the "Lead Plaintiffs"). 
 
Following a case management conference, the Lead 
Plaintiffs on December 14, 1998, filed their Amended and 
Consolidated Class Action Complaint (the "Complaint"). 
That Complaint defined the class repr esented as 
 
        [a]ll persons and entities who purchased or otherwise 
        acquired publicly traded securities . . . either of 
        Cendant or CUC during the period beginning May 31, 
        1995 through and including August 28, 1998 and who 
        were injured thereby, including all persons or entities 
        who exchanged shares of HFS common stock for 
        shares of CUC stock pursuant to the Registration 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. While this Court has heard arguments on and issued decisions in 
other Cendant cases involving different subject matters, see, e.g., In re 
Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2000) (hereinafter 
Cendant Prides I); In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 235 F.3d 176 (3d 
Cir. 
2000) (hereinafter Cendant Prides II); In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 
243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 2001), those decisions do not affect the outcome 
of this case. 
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        Statement . . . . Excluded from the Class ar e: (i) 
        defendants; (ii) members of the family of each 
        individual defendant; (iii) any entity in which any 
        defendant has a controlling interest; (iv) officers and 
        directors of Cendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates; 
        and (iv) [sic] the legal representatives, heirs, successors 
        or assigns of any such excluded party. 
 
Also on December 14, 1998, the Lead Plaintif fs filed a 
motion for class certification. That motion defined the class 
as 
 
        all persons and entities who purchased or acquired 
        Cendant Corporation ("Cendant" or the "Company") or 
        CUC International, Inc. ("CUC") publicly traded 
        securities during the period May 31, 1995 thr ough 
        August 28, 1998, inclusive (the "Class Period"), and 
        were injured thereby, including but not limited to all 
        persons who exchanged their HFS Incorporated ("HFS") 
        common stock for common stock of CUC pursuant to 
        a Registration Statement and Joint Proxy 
        Statement/Prospectus dated August 28, 1997. 
        Excluded from the Class are defendants her ein, 
        members of the immediate family of each of the 
        Individual Defendants, officers and directors of 
        Cendant, parents, subsidiaries and affiliates of the 
        Company, and the legal representatives, heirs, 
        successors or assigns of any such excluded party. . . . 
 
Lead Plaintiffs asserted they would be adequate class 
representatives because they "allege a continuing course of 
conduct that affected all Class members, whether they 
bought early or late in the Class Period, or whether they 
bought Cendant securities on the open market or pursuant 
to the Registration Statement and Joint Prospectus in the 
Merger." 
 
Three days later, on December 17, 1998, Appellants 
initiated arbitration in California against Cendant, seeking 
rescission of the Settlement Agreement and damages 
resulting from receipt of the overvalued CUC shares in 
connection with the DAI/CUC merger. In response, on 
January 21, 1999, Cendant filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of Califor nia (the 
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"California Central District") seeking to enjoin the 
arbitration. Cendant's complaint alleged violations of its 
rights under the FAA and did not interpose the existence of 
the class action as a ground for seeking injunctive relief 
from the arbitration. 
 
Meanwhile, on January 27, 1999, the District Court 
granted Lead Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 
Without restating or affirmatively announcing the class 
definition, the District Court ordered the certified class to 
represent "all purchasers or acquirers of Cendant 
Corporation or CUC International, Inc. publicly traded 
securities between May 31, 1995 and August 28, 1998 who 
were injured thereby." 
 
In response to Cendant's motion to enjoin pr eliminarily 
the California arbitration and Appellants' motion for 
summary judgment to dismiss Cendant's complaint,filed 
on February 17, 1999, the California Central District, on 
April 14, 1999, found in favor of Appellants. It ruled that 
Appellants were entitled to summary judgment because 
"the evidence indicates that claims for r escission of the 
agreement are covered by the br oad arbitration provision." 
The California Central District entered afinal order 
dismissing Cendant's injunction action, though it did not 
explicitly compel arbitration. Cendant appealed that order.9 
 
In an exercise of caution, Appellants, on April 14, 1999, 
filed a "placeholder" action in the Califor nia Central 
District. They did so to ensure that, in the event a court 
determined that some or all of their claims were not 
arbitrable, they nonetheless would comply with the one 
year statute of limitations applicable to their claims. That 
complaint expressly stated that they wer e not waiving their 
right to arbitrate.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. That appeal, Cendant Corp. v. Davidson, J., et al., No. 99-55788, is 
currently pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. The parties agreed to stay further proceedings in the 
arbitration until the Ninth Circuit rules on Cendant's appeal. 
10. "[T]his Complaint is filed in or der to ensure that plaintiffs have 
brought an action with respect to the claims asserted herein within any 
applicable statute of limitation, . . . in the event that any of 
plaintiffs' 
claims are determined not to be arbitrable . . . . By bringing this 
action, 
however, plaintiffs do not intend to waive, and are not waiving, their 
rights under various agreements to arbitrate all or any of the claims 
asserted herein." 
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Meanwhile, the District Court, on August 6, 1999, 
approved the form, and order ed dissemination, of the notice 
to be sent in the class action. In that order , the District 
Court required that Cendant make available to Lead 
Plaintiffs the stock transfer recor ds reflecting the names 
and addresses of Cendant's and CUC's shar eholders. The 
District Court further required Lead Plaintiffs to mail notice 
to all record holders of Cendant and CUC stock and to all 
brokers in the transfer records, and to publish notice of the 
class action on three different days in The Wall Street 
Journal, The New York T imes (National Edition), and the 
Dow Jones Business Newswire. The District Court 
determined that this notice "constitute[d] the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances to members of the 
Class, and will satisfy the requirements of constitutional 
due process and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure." 
 
Thereafter, Cendant petitioned the MDL Panel to transfer 
Appellants' placeholder action pending in the California 
Central District. On August 12, 1999, the MDL Panel 
transferred that action from the Califor nia Central District 
to the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1407. 
 
On October 8, 1999, the accounting firm of Heffler, 
Radetich & Saitta LLP, the Class Administrator, mailed the 
class notice to all known potential class members, as well 
as 239 brokerage firms and 141 banks and other 
institutions. Initially, 19,069 notices were sent via first 
class mail. Then, through November 29, 1999, the Class 
Administrator mailed notice to numerous other potential 
plaintiffs based on written requests, telephone requests, 
names supplied by nominees, and bulk requests by 
nominees. In all the Class Administrator sent 261,224 
notices. 
 
Of these notices, at least ten were mailed to Appellants at 
three separate addresses -- two in Palos Verdes, California 
and one in Torrance, California. The notices mailed to the 
Palos Verdes addresses were all returned to the Class 
Administrator by the United States Postal Service as 
undeliverable, with no forwarding address. The notice sent 
to the Torrance address was not r eturned. However, the 
Davidsons claim never to have received the individual 
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notice because they had moved to Incline Village, Nevada 
and did not inform Cendant of their change of address. The 
Davidsons also claim to have missed the published notice. 
 
Both the individually mailed notices and the published 
notice included the definition of the class as stated in the 
Complaint. Further, in accordance with an order of the 
District Court, the class notice warned potential class 
members that if they failed to follow the specific exclusion 
procedures, they would be deemed class members and 
would be bound by any settlement or judgment. The 
individual notice stated: 
 
         15. If you are a member of the Class . .. and you 
        wish to remain a member of the Class, you need not 
        take any further action at this time. . . . 
 
        16. As a Class member (unless you request to be 
        excluded from the Class), you will be bound by any 
        judgment, whether favorable or unfavorable, enter ed in 
        this Action. . . . 
 
         . . . 
 
         19. How To Be Excluded From The Class: YOU WILL 
        BE EXCLUDED FROM THE CLASS ONLY UPON 
        SPECIFIC REQUEST AS DESCRIBED BELOW. If you 
        request to be excluded, you will not be entitled to share 
        in the proceeds of a recovery obtained by settlement or 
        favorable judgment in the litigation, if any. Y ou also 
        will not be bound by a judgment, if any, in favor of 
        either the Class or defendants. 
 
         20. If you wish to be excluded from the Class, you 
        must so indicate by filing a written Request for 
        Exclusion, POSTMARKED ON OR BEFORE December 
        27, 1999 . . . . 
 
The published notice similarly warned: 
 
         IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED THE PUBLICL Y 
        TRADED SECURITIES . . . OF CENDANT OR CUC AS 
        DESCRIBED ABOVE, AND YOU DO NOT REQUEST 
        EXCLUSION FROM THE CLASS, YOUR RIGHTS WILL 
        BE AFFECTED BY THIS LITIGATION. . . . 
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         If you wish to be excluded from the Class, you must, 
        in accordance with the instructions contained in the 
        Notice, submit a written request for exclusion . . . . 
 
Additionally, the class action received considerable media 
coverage independent from the published notices. 
 
On December 7, 1999, almost three weeks befor e the 
final opt-out date, Cendant announced a pr oposed 
settlement that would require it to pay $2.85 billion to the 
class members (the "Class Action Settlement"). 11 On 
December 27, 1999, pursuant to the class notice, the opt- 
out period closed. The Appellants never filed a written opt- 
out, as required by the District Court and the class notice. 
 
In February 2000, Appellants claim that Cendant 
indicated, for the first time, that it would take the position 
that they were class members. On March 17, 2000, 
Cendant and the Lead Plaintiffs submitted settlement 
documents to the District Court, including a Plan of 
Allocation for the distribution of settlement pr oceeds among 
class members. Then, on March 29, 2000, the District 
Court preliminarily approved the Class Action Settlement12 
and enjoined all actions or claims that were contemplated 
by it. Pursuant to the order containing that approval, the 
Class Administrator on April 7, 2000, mailed notice of the 
Class Action Settlement and proof of claim for m packages 
to Appellants at their new Nevada address. This package 
included Lead Plaintiffs' Plan of Allocation of the settlement 
funds. 
 
The Plan of Allocation provided that any losses class 
members suffered from their transactions in CUC and 
Cendant securities would be offset by any gains they 
received through transactions in CUC and Cendant 
securities prior to Cendant's April 15, 1998 disclosure of 
the alleged accounting fraud. Thus, any damages 
Appellants suffered as a result of the DAI/CUC merger 
would be offset by the substantial gains they received in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. It is interesting to note that the Davidsons never claim that they 
were 
unaware of this announcement. 
 
12. Formal approval of the Class Action Settlement occurred on August 
15, 2000. 
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sale of over twenty million shares of the artificially-inflated 
stock before the disclosure. 
 
On April 27, 2000, possibly after learning of their 
discounted recovery under the Class Action Settlement and 
Plan of Allocation, Appellants filed a motion seeking 
clarification of the class definition, or in the alternative an 
extension of the time period to opt out of the class. Cendant 
opposed Appellants' motion, and cross-moved to enforce the 
injunction against other proceedings. The Lead Plaintiffs 
filed a brief responding to Appellants' motion, asserting that 
they did not represent the interests of Appellants in 
prosecuting their claims.13 
 
Finally, on June 20, 2000, the District Court ruled that 
Appellants were within the class, denied them an extension 
of time to opt out, and enjoined them from arbitrating their 
claims in California. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 194 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Lead Plaintiffs stated: 
 
         Lead Plaintiffs agree that the Davidsons are excluded from the 
        Class. The Davidsons were officers and dir ectors of CUC and its 
DAI 
        subsidiary during the Class Period. CUC was the surviving entity 
in 
        the merger of HFS into CUC; the name was simply changed to 
        Cendant after the merger. Thus, while it was necessary to make it 
        clear to Class Members in the Notice of Pendency that whether they 
        purchased Cendant or CUC publicly-traded securities, they were all 
        part of the same Class, the exclusion of Cendant's officers and 
        directors applied to all such officers and directors, whether 
before or 
        after the name change. Indeed, it would make no sense to exclude 
        only officers and directors of Cendant after the merger, when it 
was 
        CUC's fraudulent financial statements -- issued by the officers 
and 
        directors of the company before the mer ger (when the company was 
        named CUC) -- that formed the heart of this Action. Lead 
Plaintiffs 
        did not prosecute this class action to pr otect the interests of 
        Cendant's officers and directors, whether they served before or 
after 
        the CUC/HFS merger, and such officers and directors should not be 
        allowed to participate in the distribution of the Settlement Funds 
        that have now been recovered. 
 
         As a result, the Davidsons are, and should be, excluded from the 
        Class. 
 
At oral argument before the District Court the Lead Plaintiffs took the 
position that the trust shares were included in the class. 
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F.R.D. 158, 165-66 (D.N.J. 2000). First, the District Court 
held that Appellants were within the class because their 
shares were publicly traded within the meaning of the class 
definition. See id. at 164. Second, it looked to the class 
exclusions and determined that, despite the exclusion of 
officers and directors of Cendant, the Davidsons, as former 
officers and directors of CUC, were not excluded from the 
class. See id. Further, it found that Appellants did not meet 
their burden of showing excusable neglect for an extension 
of time to opt out of the class pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 6(b), and therefor e denied their request. See 
id. at 165. Finally, the District Court held that it had the 
authority to enjoin the ongoing California arbitration 
between Appellants and Cendant in order to implement the 
proposed Class Action Settlement, and thus it enjoined that 
arbitration. See id. at 165-66. 
 





A. Class Membership 
 
Appellants claim initially that the District Court erred in 
holding that they were class members. The District Court 
concluded that their shares were publicly traded, and thus 
were within the class definition.14  See Cendant Sec. Litig., 
194 F.R.D. at 163-64. It further found that the Davidsons 
were not "officers and directors of Cendant and its 
subsidiaries and affiliates," and concluded that they did not 
qualify for exclusion from the class on those grounds. See 
id. at 164. 
 
We accord a District Court's interpr etation of its own 
orders "particular deference." In re Fine Paper Antitrust 
Litig., 695 F.2d 494, 498 (3d Cir . 1982). The District Court, 
in determining whether Appellants were class members, 
interpreted its own orders, the or der certifying the class 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. As previously noted, the class definition included "all persons and 
entities who purchased or acquired Cendant. . . or CUC . . . publicly 
traded securities during the period May 31, 1995 thr ough August 28, 
1998," and excluded "officers and dir ectors of Cendant." 
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and the order approving the class notice, both of which 
contained the class definition. Therefor e, its interpretation 
of the class definition in those orders is entitled to 
"particular deference."15 
 
1. The Class Definition 
 
The class definition begins: "[A]ll persons and entities 
who purchased or acquired" stock. Appellants received their 
shares through the DAI/CUC merger . This Court has 
defined "purchasers" of stock to include those who buy on 
an open market and those who exchange stock in one 
company for stock in another company pursuant to a 
merger between the two companies or an acquisition of one 
company by the other. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 494 
F.2d 528, 533 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing SEC v. Nat'l Sec. Inc., 
393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969)). By virtue of the DAI/CUC 
merger, Appellants "purchased" stock. 
 
The class definition then requires that the purchaser or 
acquirer obtained "Cendant . . . or CUC . . . publicly traded 
securities." As a result of the DAI/CUC mer ger Appellants 
received a total of 32,505,099 shares of CUC stock. The 
question that we must address is whether that stock was 
"publicly traded" so as to fall within the class definition. 
 
Appellants argue the District Court err ed in holding that 
their shares were publicly traded securities because the 
Court did not give the term "publicly traded" its commonly- 
used definition. They assert that "publicly traded" means 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Appellants' attempt to distinguish Fine Paper by relying on Pittsburgh 
Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 824 F.2d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 
1987), is unfounded as the Pittsburgh T erminal court itself distinguished 
its case from Fine Paper as well as the current situation. Pittsburgh 
Terminal did not involve a court interpreting its own order, but instead 
dealt with the court interpreting a stipulation by the parties. "There is 
no 
basis for extending this principle [of "particular deference" articulated 
in 
Fine Paper] to demand similar deference in the present case to the 
district court's interpretation of a stipulation underlying a previous 
order 
. . . ." Id. Moreover, "Fine Paper is further distinguishable because it 
was 
a class action and because it involved distribution of a single fund." Id. 
at 254 n.5. Just as in Fine Paper, this case is a class action where the 
District Court is interpreting its own or ders and ultimately distributing 
a single fund of $2.85 billion. 
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tradeable on the public markets. Because the shar es they 
received were newly issued, had not been traded on any 
market, and were precluded when issued fr om being traded 
on those markets, Appellants argue that these shares could 
not, in the plain sense of the term, have been"publicly 
traded." In essence, they contend that because their shares 
were not immediately tradeable publicly, they could not be 
deemed "publicly traded" within the meaning of the class 
definition. We believe the publicly traded/publicly tradeable 
argument to be a distinction without a dif ference and agree 
with the District Court that Appellants' shar es were indeed 
"publicly traded" securities. 
 
At the outset, Appellants' argument does not paint the 
picture fully. While it is true that their shar es differed from 
the shares issued to other public investors as a result of 
the DAI/CUC merger (the difference being that Appellants' 
shares were not immediately tradeable), that difference was 
not due to the quality of the shares received. Appellants 
received exactly the same type of shares of common stock 
as all other DAI shareholders, specifically a class of CUC 
security that was publicly traded on the NYSE. 
 
The restriction on sale of the CUC stock held by 
Appellants emanated solely from the quantity of shares 
they received as a result of the mer ger, not in any way from 
the type of security they received. Due to the number of 
shares Appellants received, they wer e deemed to be 
affiliates of CUC and their ability immediately to resell 
these shares was subject to the limitations of the Securities 
Act of 1933,16 as well as the ter ms of affiliate agreements 




16. While Cendant alleges that the restriction is based on Rule 144A, it 
seems that Appellants were restricted fr om immediately selling their 
shares pursuant to Rule 145. See Cendant Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. at 163. 
That rule deems Appellants to be affiliates for Rule 145 purposes and 
thus subjects them to the registration r equirements for sale of those 
securities pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. See 17 C.F.R. 
S 230.145. 
 
17. The affiliate agreements, signed by the Davidsons, provided in part, 
"I understand that I may be deemed to be an `affiliate' of the Company, 
as such term is defined for purposes of Rule 145 . . . promulgated under 
the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and that the transferability of the 
shares 
of common stock . . . is restricted." 
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These restrictions could be avoided entir ely, however, if 
Appellants were to sell shares of CUC stock under any 
subsequent registration statement. Noticing the burden 
placed on Appellants, CUC granted Appellants liberal rights 
to demand a second registration statement that would allow 
them to "piggyback" their shares and ther efore remove any 
sales restriction from the securities. In fact, Appellants did 
just that, selling more that twenty million shares just four 
months after the transfer. In all, by January 16, 1998, 
Appellants had disposed of more than twenty-five million of 
their thirty-two and a half million CUC shar es for proceeds 
totaling more than $635 million. This exposes a logical 
disconnect in Appellants' argument. Having traded publicly 
tens of millions of shares of CUC common stock so soon 
after the DAI merger, and then to claim that they are not 
"publicly traded" securities within the class definition, is a 
non sequitur. Thus, despite the restriction on immediate 
resale, Appellants did receive "publicly traded" securities 
within the meaning of the class definition. 
 
The class definition sets the relevant period of trading as 
"May 31, 1995 through and including August 28, 1998." 
The DAI/CUC merger, in which Appellants"purchased" 
their shares, took place in July 1996. This clearly places 
Appellants within the relevant period under the class 
definition. 
 
The relevant part of the class definition concludes: "and 
who were injured thereby." Appellants' alleged injury is 
shown by the fact that they pursued their claims against 
Cendant. Yet they posit that the class did not adequately 
represent them in redressing the injury they actually 
received, as the class relied on the fraud on the market 
theory. Appellants proffer that the claims pursued by the 
Lead Plaintiffs on behalf of the class r elating to the 
accounting irregularities affected those who purchased CUC 
and/or Cendant stock on the open market. However , they 
argue that the only way the fraud on the market theory 
could have affected the DAI/CUC merger was to keep CUC's 
price inflated so that the "bust out" pr ovision that could 
have terminated that merger was not triggered. Because 
Appellants did not purchase their securities on the open 
market, but instead acquired them through individual 
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negotiations with CUC, they argue that the fraud on the 
market theory is not applicable to them. 
 
We find this argument unavailing. First, the fraud on the 
market theory did affect the DAI/CUC mer ger because, 
during the negotiations between DAI and CUC, the 
purchase price was determined by "r eference to, among 
other factors, the range of prices at which CUC stock was 
trading." This demonstrates that Appellants' Rule 10(b)(5) 
claim rests, at least in part, on the same fraud on the 
market theory pursued by the class, as the mer ger 
negotiations were based on artificial market prices. In fact, 
Cendant points out that membership in the class actually 
gave Appellants an advantage in their Rule 10(b) claim by 
lessening their burden of proof because in a typical Rule 
10(b) claim a plaintiff must show individual r eliance on a 
material misstatement, whereas under the fraud on the 
market theory reliance is presumed. See In re Apple 
Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
 
Cendant further points this Court to In r e Discovery Zone 
Securities Litigation, 181 F.R.D. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1998), to 
show that Appellants' fraud on the market ar gument is 
incorrect. In that case, the court consider ed whether an 
entity that acquired newly-issued shares of common stock 
through a merger that were not immediately tradeable (just 
as Appellants' shares were not) was a member of a class 
proceeding under a fraud on the market theory. See id. at 
590-92. The court concluded that the fact that the 
acquiring entity's claims were based on its individual 
negotiations with the defendant, rather than on pur chases 
in the open market, did not exclude it from a"fraud-on-the- 
market class" given that its claims and the claims of open 
market purchasers were based on the same"overall 
scenario" of conduct by the defendants. See id. at 591-92; 
see also In re Scorpion Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 93- 
20333, 1994 WL 774029, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1994); 
In re Nat'l Student Mktg. Litig., M.D.L. Docket No. 105, 1973 
WL 431, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 1973). 
 
Appellants cannot argue that their claims ar e based on a 
qualitatively different "overall scenario" from the claims 
raised in the class action. Under Discovery Zone , 
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Appellants' claims would be properly included in the class 
despite their individual negotiations with CUC that shape 
their particular fraud claim. Accordingly, we believe that 
Appellants' injuries fit within the class definition. 
 
2. Class Exclusions 
 
Having concluded that Appellants are within the class 
because they purchased or acquired CUC publicly traded 
securities during the relevant class period and allege they 
were injured thereby, we must next determine whether they 
fall within any of the exclusions. The only exclusion 
possible is that the Davidsons are excepted fr om the class 
as "officers and directors of Cendant." The District Court 
determined that, pursuant to the plain meaning of the class 
definition, the exclusion only disqualified officers and 
directors of Cendant, and did not exclude for mer officers 
and directors of CUC. See Cendant Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. at 
164. 
 
The Davidsons submit that Cendant, as the surviving 
entity of the CUC/HFS merger, is mer ely a continuation of 
CUC and therefore the exclusion includes all officers and 
directors of CUC and Cendant. Most important, the 
Davidsons point to the Lead Plaintiffs' belief that they did 
not represent the interests of the Davidsons, as Lead 
Plaintiffs believed that the Davidsons wer e excluded from 
the class due to their former positions as officers and 
directors of CUC. See supra note 13. 
 
Again, we accord "particular deference" to the District 
Court's interpretation of its own orders. See Fine Paper, 
695 F.2d at 498. While we find the Lead Plaintiffs' 
statement to be of interest, we do not believe that the 
District Court erred in finding that the officer and director 
exception did not apply to the Davidsons. In fact, the plain 
meaning rule, as well as other canons of construction, 
require such a finding. 
 
When the language of an instrument is plain, we look no 
further than the words of that document itself to determine 
its meaning. See Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Govt. of V.I., 
138 F.3d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1998) ("It is axiomatic that 
where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, 
it must be given its plain meaning."); Mellon Bank v. Aetna 
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Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir. 1980) ("A 
court is not authorized to construe a contract in such a 
way as to modify the plain meaning of its wor ds, under the 
guise of interpretation.") (internal quotations omitted); see 
also Richard A. Lord, 11 Williston on Contracts S 32:3, at 
408 (4th ed. 1999). 
 
Further, we look by analogy to canons of interpretation 
for statutes. One is that "[w]e presume that [Congress's] 
clear use of different terminology within a body of 
legislation is evidence of an intentional dif ferentiation." 
Lankford v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 620 F.2d 
35, 36 (4th Cir. 1980); accord Russello v. United States, 464 
U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here Congr ess includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.") (internal quotations omitted); 
Barmes v. United States, 199 F.3d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1999) 
("Different language in [a] separate clause in a statute 
indicates Congress intended distinct meanings."); Cabell 
Huntington Hosp. v. Shalala, 101 F.3d 984, 988 (4th Cir. 
1996) ("Where Congress has chosen dif ferent language in 
proximate subsections of the same statute, courts are 
obligated to give that choice effect.") (internal quotations 
omitted); Fla. Public Telecomms. Assoc., Inc. v. FCC, 54 F.3d 
857, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that when Congress uses 
different language in differ ent sections of statute, it does so 
intentionally). Cf. Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 294 (3d 
Cir. 2000) ("[It is the] normal rule of statutory construction 
that identical words used in differ ent parts of the same act 
are intended to have the same meaning.") (internal 
quotations omitted). Thus, the choice of dif ferent words to 
address analogous or related issues signifies different 
meanings. See E. Allan Farnsworth, 2 Farnsworth on 
Contracts S 7.11, at 284 & n.12 (2d ed. 1998). 
 
Similarly, we look to the canon expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the 
exclusion of another) for the proposition that when parties 
list specific items, without any more general or inclusive 
term, they intend to exclude unlisted items, even though 
they are similar to listed items. See id.  at 281. Finally, this 
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Court has stated that we "must give full cr edit to the 
language the parties have chosen to include -- or not 
include -- in their agreement." Orlando v. Interstate 
Container Corp., 100 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Applying these rules of interpretation to the language of 
the class definition, we find that the District Court correctly 
interpreted the class exclusion to include only officers and 
directors of Cendant and not any of its pr edecessors in 
interest, including pre-merger officers and directors of CUC. 
The language used in the class definition clearly excludes 
only Cendant's officers and directors. Because the 
Davidsons were never officers and dir ectors of Cendant, the 
plain language excludes them. 
 
Looking to the class definition as a whole supports the 
conclusion that the intention was only to exclude Cendant's 
officers and directors. We need not look further than the 
first sentence of the class definition to confirm this view. It 
begins by stating that the class intends to cover all 
purchasers of Cendant or CUC securities. This indicates 
that the drafter, as well as the adopting court, intended to 
include purchasers of either company's stock. However, the 
language of the class exclusion only excludes officers and 
directors of Cendant. Following the canons of construction, 
the choice of different words --"Cendant or CUC" as 
opposed to "Cendant" -- indicates that the two clauses 
have different meanings. To conclude otherwise is 
counterintuitive. 
 
Further, we look to the canon of expr essio unius est 
exclusio alterius for the proposition that when parties list 
specific items, without a term of general inclusion, they 
intend to exclude unlisted items. Here the class definition's 
language indicates that it intentionally excluded CUC from 
the class exception. Because we must give ef fect to the 
language included, as well as not included, we conclude 
that the District Court was correct in holding that the 
Davidsons were not excluded from the class as former 
officers and directors of pre-mer ger CUC. 
 
3. Opt-Out by Implication 
 
After finding that Appellants fit within the class 
definition, and that the Davidsons are not excluded under 
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the exceptions, we must determine if Appellants opted out 
of the class. At oral argument and thr oughout their briefs, 
Appellants concede that they did not follow the for mal opt- 
out procedure provided in the class notice, but appear to 
argue that they impliedly opted out of the class. They 
contend that the purpose of an opt-out requir ement is to 
force a party to take a position in or out of a class so that, 
in attempting to resolve claims against it, a defendant 
knows the exposure it faces, both to the class and to the 
opt-outs. Appellants further argue that they clearly took a 
position outside the class by filing the Califor nia arbitration 
and by reaffirming their unequivocal desire to arbitrate in 
the placeholder action. They cite In re Piper Funds, Inc., 
Institutional Government Income Portfolio Litigation, 71 F.3d 
298 (8th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that a formal opt- 
out is not always necessary. See id. at 304. 
 
However, we find Piper Funds distinguishable from this 
case. In Piper Funds, the appellant attempted to opt out of 
the class by formally advising the district court through a 
letter of its intention and desire to opt out before an opt-out 
period and procedure had been developed by the court. 
Although the district court denied that request, the Eighth 
Circuit reversed, stating that it did not dispute the normal 
rule forbidding an opt-out until after a Rule 23 notice, but 
believed that in some cases there must be an exception. It 
found that the exception applies when a party with an 
immediate right to arbitrate attempts to opt out before the 
Rule 23 procedure is initiated but is denied that request. 
See id. Here Appellants never infor med the District Court of 
their intention to opt out, neither before nor after the Rule 
23 class notice was distributed. Thus, Piper Funds does not 
advance their argument. 
 
Moreover, numerous courts have held that the mere 
pendency of an individual litigation or arbitration does not 
relieve a plaintiff of the obligation to opt out of a class 
action. See, e.g., In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P'ship Litig., 
164 F.R.D. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("It is well-established 
that pendency of an individual action does not excuse a 
class member from filing a valid request for exclusion.") 
(internal quotations omitted); In r e Prudential-Bache Energy 
Income P'ship Sec. Litig., No. MDL-0888, 1995 WL 20613, at 
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*2 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 1995) (rejecting class member's claim 
that pending arbitration proceeding was sufficient notice of 
intent to opt out); Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Grinnell 
Corp., 59 F.R.D. 512, 513 (S.D.N.Y . 1973) ("[T]he existence 
of [the individual] action did not automatically exclude 
plaintiffs as potential members of the class. The exclusion 
could only be effected by compliance with the provisions of 
Rule 23(c)(2)(B)."). In this context, Appellants cannot 
succeed in their argument that Cendant's knowledge of the 
arbitration was sufficient notice for their opting out, and 
thus Appellants did not opt out of the class impliedly. 
 
* * * * * 
 
In sum, Appellants fall within the class definition 
because they purchased or acquired CUC or Cendant 
publicly traded securities. The Davidsons wer e not excluded 
from the class as former officers and directors of pre- 
merger CUC because the exception only excluded officers 
and directors of Cendant. Furthermor e, we conclude that 
Appellants failed to opt out of the class and thus are bound 
by the class settlement. We therefor e affirm the District 
Court's finding that Appellants are within the class. 
 
B. Extension of the Opt-Out Deadline 
 
Appellants further allege that the District Court erred in 
refusing to grant them an extension of time to opt out of 
the class. They maintain that if they are enjoined from 
pursuing the arbitration and are found to be within the 
class definition, they should still not be included as class 
members because the District Court abused its discr etion 
in failing to extend the time for them to opt out of the class. 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) pr ovides: 
 
        When by these rules or by a notice given ther eunder or 
        by order of court an act is requir ed or allowed to be 
        done at or within a specified time, the court for cause 
        shown may at any time in its discretion . . . (2) upon 
        motion made after the expiration of the specified period 
        permit the act to be done where the failure to act was 
        the result of excusable neglect . . . . 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). The definition of"excusable neglect" 
recently has been discussed in a related litigation, In re 
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Cendant Corp. Prides Litigation. There, the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, District Judge 
Walls (the same District Judge as in this case), stated: 
 
        The Supreme Court has decreed that the determination 
        of whether one party's neglect to adhere to a deadline 
        is excusable should take into account all relevant 
        circumstances surrounding the delay. See Pioneer 
        Invest. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 
        507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). Relevant factors include"the 
        danger of prejudice to the [nonmovant], the length of 
        the delay and its potential impact on judicial 
        proceedings, the reason for the delay, including 
        whether it was within the reasonable contr ol of the 
        movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." 
        Id. at 395. To this roster, the Third Circuit has added 
        "(1) whether the inadvertence reflected pr ofessional 
        incompetence such as ignorance of the rules of 
        procedure, (2) whether an asserted inadvertence 
        reflects an easily manufactured excuse incapable of 
        verification by the court, and, (3) a complete lack of 
        diligence." Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 
        517 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 189 F.R.D. 321, 324 
(D.N.J. 1999), aff 'd, 233 F .3d 188, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(alteration in original). 
 
This Court reviews a District Court's findings concerning 
excusable neglect for abuse of discretion. See Cendant 
Prides I, 233 F.3d at 189, 197; Jones v. Chemetron Corp., 
212 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2000); see also In re 
PaineWebber Ltd. P'ship Litig., 147 F .3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 
1998); Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1994). 
An abuse of discretion occurs when the action of the 
District Court is clearly contrary to reason and not justified 
by the evidence. See Springfield Crusher , Inc. v. 
Transcontinental Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 1967). 
A District Court also abuses its discretion if it is influenced 
by erroneous legal conclusions or applies the wrong legal 
standards. See Cendant Prides I, 233 F .3d at 192 (holding 
that an abuse of discretion occurs when the District Court's 
decision "rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law 
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to fact.") (internal quotations omitted); Oddi v. Ford Motor 
Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000); Hanover Potato 
Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993); 
see also Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 
1052 (7th Cir. 1998). In addition, we have stated that "[a]n 
abuse of discretion can occur when no r easonable person 
would adopt the district court's view." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
Here the District Court found that Appellants' alleged 
failure to receive notice did not warrant an extension of the 
opt-out deadline. See Cendant Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. at 
165; In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., No. 94- 
3996, 1999 WL 395407, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1999); 
Gross v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 934 F . Supp. 1340, 1345 
(M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding that no extension was warranted 
where the class notice was sent to a potential class 
member's old address despite having been advised of the 
change of address). The District Court found unconvincing 
Appellants' argument that Cendant had not tr eated them as 
class members until after the class opt-out deadline had 
passed. It found that Appellants did not become class 
members until they failed to opt out before the deadline. 
Consequently, Cendant had no reason to tr eat Appellants 
as class members or inform them of their potential class 
status. Finally, the District Court did not accept Appellants' 
explanation of their delay as warranting an extension of 
time to opt out. See Cendant Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. at 165. 
 
We hold that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to allow Appellants an extension of 
time to opt out of the class. As stated above, we will not 
find an abuse of discretion unless the decision is clearly 
contrary to reason and not justified by the evidence or 
prevailing law. Here the District Court found that 
Appellants did not meet the excusable neglect standard 
simply because they allegedly did not receive notice and 
because Cendant (the defendant) did not infor m potential 
plaintiffs (Appellants) of their rights and duties. See In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig. , 177 F.R.D. 
216, 231 (D.N.J. 1997) ("[D]ue process does not require 
that every class member receive actual notice so long as the 
court reasonably selected a means likely to apprise 
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interested parties."). The District Court pointed to the 
individually mailed notice, the published notice, and the 
press coverage that the initiation of the class action and the 
proposed settlement received in holding that Appellants 
should have been aware of the class action and the 
potential it had to affect their inter ests. See Cendant Sec. 
Litig., 194 F.R.D. at 165. 
 
In addition to the District Court's reasoning, Appellants 
do not qualify for the excusable neglect exception because 
their actions cause prejudice to Cendant and may not 
comport with the good faith requirement. 18 See Cendant 
Prides I, 233 F.3d at 195. While Appellants argue that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The dissent argues that "the majority's attempt to cure the 
deficiencies of the District Court's analysis[is in]consistent with our 
jurisprudence which requires the District Court to explain its excusable 
neglect reasoning." It points out that our most recent articulation of 
this 
principle is in In re Orthopedic Bone Scr ew Products Liability 
Litigation, 
No. 99-2054, wherein we assert that we " `have imposed a duty of 
explanation on District Courts when they conduct"excusable neglect" 
analysis.' " Id. at 13 (quoting Cendant Prides I, 233 F.3d at 196). From 
these statements the dissent makes the leap of logic that the duty to 
explain the rationale for excusable neglect deter minations means that all 
Pioneer factors must be explicitly consider ed by the District Court. 
While 
a consideration of all relevant Pioneer factors is optimal, this best 
practice is not our law. Our law is that " `it is a salutary practice [for 
a 
court] to give the litigants, either orally or in writing, at least a 
minimum 
articulation of the reasons for its decision.' " Orthopedic Bone Screw, 
No. 
99-2054, at 13 (quoting Interpace Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 438 F.2d 
401, 404 (3d Cir. 1971)). What the District Court did in this case, unlike 
in Orthopedic Bone Screw in which no explanation was given, meets the 
minimum articulation threshold. 
 
The dissent then castigates our opinion for noting additional reasons 
not to find excusable neglect in this appeal. Y et we are merely following 
precisely what we did in one of the Cendant  opinions the dissent cites to 
support its position. In Cendant Prides II, 235 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2000), 
this Court, after holding that the District Court abused its discretion by 
failing to analyze the Pioneer excusable neglect factors, went on to 
analyze those factors, including prejudice and bad faith, the same 
factors the dissent finds us in error for analyzing. After determining 
that 
any delay or neglect on the part of appellant was excusable neglect, the 
Cendant Prides II Court remanded "solely for inclusion in settlement 
proceedings," not for analysis of the excusable neglect factors, as the 
dissent seems to imply is required. See id. at 182, 183-84. 
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Cendant will not be prejudiced by excluding them from the 
class because Cendant knew of their claims befor e it 
reached the class settlement, their argument is 
unpersuasive. Reliance by Appellants on Mars Steel Corp. v. 
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 
120 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1988), In r e Del-Val Financial Corp. 
Securities Litigation, 154 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), and 
Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841 F .2d 513 (3d Cir. 1988), 
is unavailing, as those cases are easily distinguishable on 
the prejudice issue. In Mars Steel, the court granted an 
extension of time to opt out because the defendant did not 
even argue that it would suffer pr ejudice. See Mars Steel, 
120 F.R.D. at 53. Similarly, in Del-V al, the court extended 
the time to opt out of the class action because the party 
seeking exclusion intended to proceed with arbitration 
against a non-settling defendant, and therefor e the settling 
defendant would not be prejudiced by the extension. See 
Del-Val, 154 F.R.D. at 97 n.2. Finally, Dominic did not even 
involve a class action. In that individual pr oducts liability 
action, the District Court granted plaintiff an extension of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The dissent argues as pungently as possible that the procedural 
posture of the Cendant Prides II case makes its excusable neglect 
analysis unavailable for support by the majority her e in analyzing 
whether the District Court correctly denied Appellants' motion to extend 
the time for them to opt out of the class. Cendant Prides II made a de 
novo determination with respect to the excusable neglect factors not 
applied by the District Court in that case afterfinding that the District 
Court abused its discretion by failing to apply the Pioneer factors in 
denying the late filing of a proof of claim in a class action. Cendant 
Prides II, 235 F.3d at 183. Here we conclude that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to extend the time for 
Appellants to opt out of the class. In so doing, we apply the same 
standard of review (abuse of discr etion) as our Court applied in Cendant 
Prides II. While we also discuss other Pioneer factors supporting our 
affirmance, this discussion is not necessary to our decision to affirm. 
But in Cendant Prides II the analysis of Pioneer factors was necessary to 
the decision and thus required de novo consideration. 
 
In this context, we find the dissent's characterization of our excusable 
neglect analysis as "[in]consistent with[this Court's] jurisprudence" to 
be 
unsupported. Moreover, for the dissent to conclude that a duty of 
explanation meeting a minimum articulation thr eshold equals full blown 
articulation is fallacious. 
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time to serve notice and the complaint on a thir d party 
defendant who was already subject to personal jurisdiction 
of the court. See Dominic, 841 F.2d at 516. This Court 
affirmed, finding no prejudice to the third-party defendant 
because it was already a party to the suit and knew of all 
the claims and specific allegations. 
 
Here Cendant, the settling defendant, would clearly be 
prejudiced by a finding that Appellants ar e not within the 
class. Appellants' substantial holdings could subject 
Cendant to additional liabilities for the accounting fraud 
allegations that they settled in the class action vis-a-vis all 
eligible persons who did not opt out of the class. Permitting 
Appellants to opt out now will deprive Cendant of the 
finality it sought in settling the class action, r egardless 
whether the March 24, 2000 letter from Appellants' 
counsel, see infra note 21, put it on notice of Appellants' 
claims and specific allegations before the District Court 
formally approved the settlement.19 Cf. Prudential Sales 
Practices Litig., 164 F.R.D. at 371-72 ("Defendants would be 
loath to offer substantial sums of money in compromise 
settlements of class actions unless they can r ely on the 
notice provision of Rule 23 to bind class members."). 
 
Finally, it is plausible to argue that Appellants do not 
meet the excusable neglect standard because the record 
draws into question whether they may have failed to 
comport with the good faith requirement. See Mars Steel, 
120 F.R.D. at 52 (holding that a party's tar diness designed 
to gain a tactical advantage violates the good faith 
requirement). Appellants, in their brief to this Court, claim 
that "[t]hey did not wait strategically to see what kind of 
settlement was proposed before communicating their intent 
to arbitrate their claims." Yet it is possible to infer they did 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. One could argue that because Cendant pr oposed a settlement before 
the opt-out period passed it could not have known whether Appellants 
later would opt out. While it is true that Cendant proposed a settlement 
on December 7, 1999, three weeks before the final opt-out date, 
December 27, 1999, that settlement was not appr oved until March 29, 
2000, three months after the final opt-out date. Therefore, because the 
Appellants did not opt out, it is fair to say that Cendant was bargaining 
for finality as to the Appellants' claims when its settlement was 
approved. 
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just that, seemingly seeking a strategic advantage in not 
filing a formal opt-out, and in the timing of their motion for 
clarification of the class or in the alter native for an 
extension of time to opt out of the class. 
 
From the time of the initial disclosure of the accounting 
irregularities through the present, Appellants have acted 
with abundant caution. First, they filed a placeholder suit 
in the California Central District to ensur e that they 
complied with the statute of limitations in the event that 
the Ninth Circuit ruled against them (thus for eclosing their 
opportunity to arbitrate). In addition, Appellantsfiled 
objections to the Class Action Settlement and Plan of 
Allocation, just in case this Court, as we have, determines 
that they are class members subject to the ter ms of the 
settlement.20 However, even though they were aware of the 
existence of the class action before the opt-out date passed, 
Appellants never filed a protective opt-out to ensure that 
their claims would be arbitrated. With sophisticated 
investors such as the Davidsons, who were assisted by 
exceptional counsel, it is not a leap of faith to make the 
logical inference that their failure tofile a formal opt-out 
was a strategic decision. 
 
Additionally, as previously mentioned, the opt-out period 
closed on December 27, 1999. Appellants contend in their 
brief to this Court that they learned in February 2000 that 
Cendant considered them class members. Y et, they took no 
court action until after they received the Plan of Allocation 
mailed on April 7, 2000.21 Only after they discovered that 
their recovery under the Class Action Settlement was 
significantly less than expected did they file, on April 27, 
2000, a motion for clarification of the class definition, or in 
the alternative for an extension of time to opt out of the 
class. This tardiness again points to Appellants attempting 
to gain a tactical advantage and counsels against extending 
the opt-out period. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. That case is currently pending befor e this Court, No. 00-2709. 
21. While Appellants' counsel did send Cendant's counsel a letter on 
March 24, 2000, indicating that Appellants did not consider themselves 
to be part of the class, they took no formal action to ensure this 
position 
until three weeks after the Class Administrator provided them with the 
Plan of Allocation. 
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As a result, we find that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to grant Appellants an extension 
of time to opt out. We agree with the District Court that 
Appellants did not qualify for the excusable neglect 
exception and therefore affirm its holding. 
 
C. Enjoining of the California Arbitration 
 
Finally, Appellants and the dissent argue that the District 
Court erred in enjoining the ongoing Califor nia arbitration. 
They specifically contend that it violated the F AA by 
enjoining the arbitration mandated by the Califor nia 
Central District as well as several agreements among the 
Appellants, DAI, and CUC/Cendant calling for , inter alia, 
arbitration of disputes.22 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Conversely, Appellants and the dissent ar gue that the District Court 
should have been res judicata bound by the decision of the California 
Central District with respect to its decision to deny Cendant's motion to 
enjoin the arbitration. In other words, they allege that the District 
Court 
should have given preclusive effect to the California Central District's 
decision that the Appellants' claims were arbitrable and, under the 
doctrine of res judicata, referred their claims back to arbitration in 
California. The fatal flaw of this contention is acknowledged by the 
dissent. The parties before the Califor nia Central District Court did not 
brief, and that Court in its three and one-half page decision did not 
mention, whether any of the Appellants were putative class members. 
Without even acknowledgment of the class action, it is spurious to 
suggest that res judicata precludes the District Court from deciding 
whether Appellants' claims could be decided in the class action, i.e., 
whether they were class members. See Hopewell Township Citizens I-95 
Comm. v. Volpe, 482 F.2d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1973) (finding res judicata 
does not apply where "at least much of the subject matter of the present 
lawsuit has not been and could not have been ar gued in the previous 
actions"); see also Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy 
Res., Ltd., 99 F.3d 746, 756 (5th Cir . 1996) (holding that res judicata 
did 
not apply on the basis that it "is axiomatic that a claim that has not yet 
accrued is not ripe for adjudication, and hence it is not a claim that 
`could have been litigated' in a previous lawsuit"). 
 
Here the California Central District"was not, and could not have been, 
presented with -- and thus did not, and could not, decide -- the issue 
of whether the Davidsons and the Trusts ar e Class Members." The 
California Central District issued its or der on April 14, 1999, over 
eight 
months before the final opt-out date for the class action in New Jersey 
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The District Court's authority to enter such an injunction 
derives from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1651. Under that 
Act, "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act 
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agr eeable to the 
usages and principles of law." When a federal court has 
jurisdiction over a case, the All Writs Act grants it ancillary 
jurisdiction to issue all writs "necessary or appropriate in 
aid of " that jurisdiction. See In r e Baldwin-United Corp., 
770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985). Ther e is an analogous 
provision in the Anti-Injunction Act. 28 U.S.C.S 2283 ("A 
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to 
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly 
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of 
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."). 
 
The power given to federal courts under the All W rits Act 
and the Anti-Injunction Act allows them to enjoin state 
court proceedings when necessary to protect federal court 
judgments. See Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1068-69 (11th Cir. 1993). "Such 
`federal injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state 
court from so interfering with a federal court's 
consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair 
the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that 
case.' " Baldwin-United, 770 F .2d at 335 (quoting Atlantic 
Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 
281, 295 (1970)). In class actions, this power allows federal 
courts to protect settlement efforts and to prevent 
"inconsistent and inequitable results." In re Joint E. & S. 
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
Further, "the All-Writs Act per mits courts to certify a 
national class action and to stay pending federal and state 
cases brought on behalf of class members." Id. at 37. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
-- December 27, 1999. Consequently, at the time the California Central 
District issued its ruling, Appellants were no more than potential class 
members, with every right to opt out of the class to pursue their 
arbitration claims. Cendant could not have asked the California Central 
District to declare Appellants class members given their unilateral right 
to opt out of the class up until December 27, 1999. Because the issue 
of whether Appellants were class members could not have been argued 
in the previous action, res judicata is inapplicable. 
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The All Writs Act and the Anti-Injunction Act also give 
the federal courts the power to enjoin arbitrations. See 
Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1069; PaineW ebber P'ship Litig., 1996 WL 
374162, at *4 ("[A] Court may enjoin arbitration -- even 
before judgment has been entered in this action -- where 
that injunction would be `in aid of its jurisdiction' within 
the terms of the Baldwin-United line of cases."). The District 
Court, in finding that it had the authority to enjoin the 
continued prosecution of class members' claims, relied on 
PaineWebber for the proposition that a district court has 
the ability to enjoin an ongoing arbitration in or der to give 
effect to a class settlement. See PaineW ebber, 1996 WL 
374162. In that case, the court denied fifteen plaintiffs' 
attempts to arbitrate claims covered by a class action where 
they all failed to opt out of the class befor e the deadline. 
See id. at *4-5. 
 
We agree that, notwithstanding the federal courts' power 
to enjoin other proceedings, there ar e strong policies that 
support giving effect to agreements to arbitrate. "The FAA 
was enacted to reverse centuries of judicial hostility to 
arbitration agreements by placing arbitration agreements 
upon the same footing as other contracts." Pritzker v. Merrill 
Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1113 (3d Cir. 
1993) (internal quotations omitted). Put another way, the 
FAA seeks "to assure those who desir ed arbitration and 
whose contracts related to interstate commer ce that their 
expectations would not be undermined by federal judges." 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984). In 
particular, our Court recognizes that"federal law 
presumptively favors the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements." Harris v. Green T ree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 
178 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
We also recognize that the Supreme Court requires that 
arbitrable claims be arbitrated, "even wher e the result 
would be the possible inefficient maintenance of separate 
proceedings in different forums." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985); accord Piper Funds, 71 
F.3d at 303. In fact, the FAA "r equires piecemeal resolution 
when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement." 
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (emphasis omitted). Securities lawsuits 
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often may require bifurcated pr oceedings in order to give 
effect to arbitration agreements. See Dean Witter, 470 U.S. 
at 218 n.5. 
 
In the same vein, the mere existence of a parallel 
proceeding that seeks to adjudicate the same in personam 
cause of action does not in itself provide sufficient grounds 
for an injunction against a state action or arbitration in 
favor of a pending federal action. See Carlough v. Amchem 
Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1993); see also 
Baldwin-United, 770 F.2d at 336 (citing Vendo Co. v. Lektro- 
Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977) ("We have never 
viewed parallel in personam actions as inter fering with the 
jurisdiction of either court.")); PaineW ebber, 1996 WL 
374162, at *3. Even actions derived from the same cause 
against the same defendants may be maintained 
simultaneously in federal and state courts. See Carlough, 
10 F.3d at 202; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., 992 F .2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 
1993) (refusing to apply the All Writs Act because the state 
complaint alleged a contract breach independent of the 
District Court's protective order, and thus the state court 
adjudication would not affect interpretation or enforcement 
of the order). "Any doubts as to the pr opriety of a federal 
injunction against state court proceedings should be 
resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed 
in an orderly fashion . . . ." Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 398 
U.S. at 297. 
 
Moreover, an injunction may only be issued under the 
Anti-Injunction Act when there is a "r eal or potential 
conflict [that] threatens the very authority of the federal 
court." Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105, 108 (2d 
Cir. 1971). For an injunction to be "necessary . . . in aid of 
. . . jurisdiction" "it is not enough that the requested 
injunction is related to that jurisdiction, but it must be 
necessary in aid of that jurisdiction." Carlough, 10 F.3d at 
202 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted). That is, an 
injunction will only be "necessary" "to pr event a state court 
[or arbitrator] from so interfering with a federal court's 
consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair 
the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that 
case." Id. 
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Yet a class action calls for distinct rules in connection 
with the need to have as many common issues as possible 
disposed of in a single proceeding. See Coopers & Lybrand 
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470 (1978) ("Ther e are special 
rules relating to class actions and, to that extent, they are 
a special kind of litigation."); Henry v. City of Detroit 
Manpower Dept., 763 F.2d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); 
Avila v. Van Ru Credit Corp., No. 94-c-3234, 1995 WL 
41425, at * 9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 1995) ("[C]lass actions 
involve complex litigation and special rules."); Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. , 98 
F.R.D. 254, 271 (D. Del. 1983) ("[C]ommon issues should be 
resolved in one class proceeding."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3) 
(stating that a class action is maintainable when"questions 
of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of 
the controversy"). For example, in multidistrict class 
actions consolidated in a single district court, sound 
authority exists to enjoin other parties, even states, from 
bringing actions that would affect the rights of any 
plaintiffs or class members. In Baldwin-United, the Second 
Circuit found that the existence of multiple and harassing 
state actions could only frustrate the district court's effort 
to craft a settlement because the success of any federal 
settlement depended on the parties agreeing to release "any 
and all related civil claims the plaintif fs had against the 
settling defendants based on the same facts." See Baldwin- 
United, 770 F.2d at 337. The court concluded "that the 
existence of actions in state court would jeopar dize [the 
district court's] ability to rule on the settlements, would 
substantially increase the cost of litigation,[and] would 
create a risk of conflicting results . .. . Under the 
circumstances we conclude that the injunction .. . was 
unquestionably `necessary or appropriate in aid of ' the 
federal court's jurisdiction." Id. at 333, 338. Similarly, in 
Asbestos Litigation, the court's injunction was necessary to 
implement the settlement covering "all pr esent and future 
persons injured by asbestos-containing pr oducts." Asbestos 
Litig., 134 F.R.D. at 38. 
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In deciding whether to enter the injunction that Cendant 
sought enjoining the California arbitration, the District 
Court here had to reconcile two seemingly conflicting lines 
of authority and policies: the one giving it authority to issue 
all orders to maintain and preserve its jurisdiction over the 
consolidated multidistrict litigation cases in this Cendant 
group of actions, and the public policy favoring giving effect 
to arbitration agreements such as those enter ed between 
Cendant and Appellants. 
 
Appellants and the dissent rely on the Eighth Circuit's 
decision in Piper Funds, 71 F.3d 298, in support of their 
argument that the District Court violated the FAA by 
enjoining the California arbitration. Despite their assertions 
to the contrary, Piper Funds is of little help to Appellants. 
Although the Eighth Circuit did find that the district court 
there should not have enjoined the arbitration, it did so 
under circumstances far different fr om ours. It found that 
because the appellant clearly, in writing, expr essed its 
desire to opt out of a class before the class notice and opt- 
out procedure were even developed, the injunction violated 
the FAA and appellant's immediate right to arbitrate by 
enjoining the arbitration pending a formal opt-out. See 
Piper Funds, 71 F.3d at 303-04; see also VMS Sec. Litig, 21 
F.3d 139, 141-42 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that where class 
members had not opted out of class action, they wer e 
bound by class action settlement which released their 
claims against the defendant even though they had 
obtained an award in the arbitration filed before resolution 
of the class action). 
 
In Piper Funds, the Eighth Circuit stated: 
 
        [P]roper regard for the F AA required that the court 
        promptly take one of three actions: it could stay the 
        class action while [the potential class member's] claim 
        is arbitrated; it could deny the request to opt out (for 
        example, because [the potential class member's] 
        arbitration claim is not arbitrable or its r equest to opt 
        out was too late); or it could grant the r equest to opt 
        out. 
 
71 F.3d at 304 (emphasis added). Its acknowledgment that 
proper regard for the FAA allows a court to deny a request 
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to opt out, because that request came too late, concedes 
the merits of the situation we have here, a point the dissent 
glosses over. Where a party who desir es arbitration fails 
timely to opt out of the class, the FAA does not preclude a 
district court from denying a class member's r equest to 
pursue arbitration. Thus, Piper Funds is, by its own words, 
unavailing where Appellants fail to opt out of the class. See 
PaineWebber, 1996 WL 374162, at *5 (finding that case 
inapposite to Piper Funds where the plaintiffs did not 
immediately express their position that they would opt out 
but instead waited until after the opt-out deadline had 
passed); Prudential P'ship Litig., 158 F .R.D. at 304 ("Class 
members who wish to opt out in order to . . . seek 
arbitration in a forum in existence at the time of the 
original opt-out deadline have no excuse for their neglect to 
opt out; they are simply seeking to escape consequences 
known to them at the time they chose to remain in the 
class."). 
 
Appellants and the dissent cite no case law holding that 
the FAA trumps, and thereby forgives, Appellants' failure to 
opt out. This presages that the District Court did not 
violate the policies of the FAA when it enjoined Appellants 
from proceeding with their arbitration after they did not opt 
out of the class. See, e.g., VMS Sec. Litig., 21 F.3d at 141- 
42. 
 
As for the enjoining of the California arbitration in its 
entirety, we review the terms of an injunction for abuse of 
discretion. John F. Harkins Co. v. W aldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 
657, 658 (3d Cir. 1986). Any finding that is a prerequisite 
to the issuance of an injunction (here whether Appellants 
were subject to the class action, e.g., were members of the 
class and were properly denied an extension of time to opt 
out) is reviewed according to the standar d applicable to 
that particular determination, and we willfind an abuse of 
discretion vis-a-vis the injunction if the District Court's 
prerequisite finding was in error under the applicable 
standard of review. See id. 
 
We note, however, that the District Court could enjoin 
only claims in arbitration that were resolved by the Class 
Action Settlement. Conversely, the District Court could not 
enjoin the arbitration with respect to any claims that were 
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not covered by the Class Action Settlement. In its June 20, 
2000 Order, the District Court granted Cendant's cross- 
motion to enforce the March 29, 2000 injunction against 
continued prosecution by Appellants of their arbitration 
proceeding against Cendant. To the extent that their prior 
agreements to arbitrate covered claims not disposed of or 
released in the Class Action Settlement, the District Court 
was without the authority to enjoin those pr oceedings 
because its action was not "necessary or appr opriate in aid 
of [its] . . . jurisdiction." The arbitration of issues outside 
the scope of the class action, e.g., possibly the 1.6 million 
stock options that Cendant concedes were beyond the 
scope of the class action, does not interfer e with the 
District Court's disposition and does not seriously impair 
its flexibility and authority to decide the class action. 
Further, arbitration of issues outside the bounds of the 
class action issues cannot lead to inconsistent and 
inequitable results, as that arbitration pr esents no "real or 
potential conflict that threatens the very authority of the 
federal court." Vernitron Corp., 440 F.2d at 108. These 
"parallel" actions can be maintained without conflict. See 
Carlough, 10 F.3d at 202. 
 
Unlike Baldwin-United and Asbestos Litigation, where the 
proposed settlements called for enjoining all claims, as they 
would have affected the settlement and pr ovided for 
inconsistent holdings, the settlement in this case only 
requires that the class members release claims dealing with 
"publicly traded securities."23 The arbitration of peripheral 
claims, possibly including the 1.6 million options, cannot 
affect the District Court's ability or authority to settle the 
class claims dealing with publicly traded securities. An 
injunction preventing the arbitration of those claims is 
clearly not necessary in aid of the District Court's 
jurisdiction in the class action. Therefor e, we find the 
District Court abused its discretion in enjoining, in its 
entirety, the California arbitration, as it did not have the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. "Each Class Member shall release all`Released Claims,' which 
include any and all claims . . . that are based upon, related to, arise 
from, or are connected with the pur chase, acquisition, sale or 
disposition 
of CUC, HFS, or Cendant publicly-traded securities .. . during the Class 
Period . . . ." 
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authority, under the All Writs Act, to enjoin those actions or 
proceedings that were outside the scope of the class action 
and could not have had any effect on its flexibility and 
authority to decide and settle the class action. 24 
 
It must be noted that through this opinion we take no 
position on whether any issues remain for r esolution in 
arbitration. It is entirely possible that all of the issues 
before the arbitrator have been settled and/or released by 
the class action. We make no determination on this issue 
because we believe it is for the arbitrator, not the District 
Court, to determine whether a claim befor e him was 
decided in the class action. See, e.g., Great Western 
Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 232 (3d Cir. 1997) 
("[A] court compelling arbitration should pr eserve the 
remaining disputed issues for the arbitrator to decide."). 
 
Respecting the principles of the FAA, as well as the opt- 
out requirement of class actions, we will allow the 
California arbitration to proceed, subject to affirmance by 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but only to the 
extent of arbitrating claims that were not settled and 
released in the class action. We further hold that it is for 
the arbitrator to determine whether the claims Appellants 
are pursuing in the California arbitration were disposed of 
in the Class Action Settlement. To the extent that the 
claims were not included in the class action, the arbitrator 
has the power to decide those issues. He is only pr ecluded 
from deciding any issues that were r esolved (either through 
a court decision or release of claims) as part of the class 
action. See PaineWebber, 1996 WL 374162, at *4 ("[T]he 
Court has the ability to enjoin further litigation by class 
members involving the subject matter of this class action, 




24. Strangely, the dissent gives the strong impression that we approve 
and are not reversing the District Court's order enjoining the 
arbitration. 
As review of this opinion shows, that is misleading. What the dissent 
really argues is that, in limiting our r eversal to only those issues 
outside 
the scope of the class action, we are not r eversing the District Court 
enough. In our view, the dissent's position -- that reversal of the 
injunction is called for as to all issues included as well as not included 
in the class action -- simply goes too far . 
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We close with a general comment on the well-crafted 
dissent of Judge Garth challenging, inter alia , our holding 
that the District Court can enjoin those claims in the 
arbitration resolved in the Class Action Settlement. 
Hyperbole aside, the dissent's theme is implicitly as follows. 
The FAA trumps the All Writs Act. If arbitration is elected 
as a means to resolve a dispute, a subsequent injunction, 
the dissent argues, "can never be appr opriate in a case 
such as this one." Because arbitration was elected by 
Appellants the month prior to class certification, and 
because the California District Court ruled over Cendant's 
objection that the California arbitration should not be 
enjoined, the New Jersey District Court in a class action is 
shorn of the ability to enjoin any aspect of Appellants' 
claims in that arbitration. 
 
The dissent's theme is counterposed by our theme: 
Appellants -- who concededly knew of the class action, filed 
their arbitration complaint after the class action was 
begun, knew that there was an opt-out r equirement in that 
action (though they claim not to have received notice of the 
precise date), and did not request an extension of time to 
opt out until no less than two months after they learned of 
the opt-out deadline -- can no longer seek to arbitrate 
claims already decided in the class action. Appellants (and 
no one else) controlled whether they wer e in or out of the 
class. They could have opted out of the class at any time 
during the opt out period, covering almost a full year after 
they sought arbitration, but never did so. Had they done so, 
they could have arbitrated their claims en toto .25 
 
This theme, juxtaposed against that of the dissent, 
follows a reasoning tailored to the specific facts of each case 
rather than a certitude generalized to exclude all 
consideration of when class action determinations prevail 
over arbitration. We leave for another day that issue. Also 
not before us is whether the claims of Appellants are 
enforceable under the FAA. They ar e. But not always! As 
noted in Piper Funds, in quoting S 12(d) of the National 
Association of Security Dealers' Code with r espect to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Thus, we disclaim the dissent's Rabelaisian r emark that enjoining an 
arbitration in this case "can never be appr opriate." 
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arbitration as a means of resolving disputes in the 
securities industry, " `such claims shall be eligible for 
arbitration . . . pursuant to the parties' contractual 
agreement, if any, if a claimant demonstrates that it has 
elected not to participate in the putative or certified class 
action or, if applicable, has complied with any conditions 
for withdrawing from the class prescribed by the court.' " 
Piper Funds, 71 F.3d at 302. Here Appellants failed to 
demonstrate that they affirmatively elected not to 
participate in the putative or certified class and did not 
comply with any conditions for withdrawing fr om that class. 




For the foregoing reasons, we affir m the District Court's 
rulings as to the inclusion of Appellants in the class as well 
as its refusing to grant them an extension of time to opt 
out. However, we reverse the District Court's enjoining of 
the entire arbitration and will allow that arbitration to 
proceed, though only as to issues not r esolved as part of 
the class action. We further hold that it is for the arbitrator, 
not the District Court, to determine which, if any, of 
Appellants' claims are ripe for decision in accordance with 
this Opinion and the Class Action Settlement. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision. In 
particular, and apart from any other doctrine of law, I 
cannot understand how the majority can permit a New 
Jersey District Court to enjoin arbitration and thereby 
overrule an order by a companion district court in 
California compelling arbitration,1  when that arbitration 
order was entered months before notice of class 
certification was even distributed and when that order 
embraced each and every one of the Davidsons' claims. 
 
This issue of arbitration vis-a-vis class certification is of 
overriding importance, and its proper r esolution cannot be 
overemphasized. Indeed, just recently this Court has 
announced the formation of a Task For ce on selection of 
class counsel and has enumerated a number of issues for 
the Task Force to consider.2 I suggest that this question of 
arbitration-class certification is one which in my opinion 




I suggest that the sequence in which the majority 
discusses issues in its opinion is inappropriate and in effect 
"puts the cart before the horse." I should not be surprised 
that the discussion of the arbitration injunction issue-- 
unquestionably the most significant and important in this 
case and an issue of first impression--was relegated to the 
very last discussion in an otherwise mundane appeal. 
Obviously, if one "goes into" the arbitration injunction 
discussion with a holding that the appellants--the 
Davidsons--were and are class members, all else falls into 
the majority's theory. As one goes in, that's how one comes 
out. That is the tactic employed by the majority her e. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The California Central District Court's order, Cendant Corp. v. 
Davidson, No. 99-0587 (C.D. Cal. April 8, 1999) appears in the appendix 
at App. 704-09. 
 
2. See, e.g., Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 721 (3d Cir. 2001), 
discussing our overall supervisory role and our responsibilities in the 
selection of class counsel and in attorneys' fee awards as well as in 
safeguarding fair settlements of class actions. 
 
                                42 
  
However, if, with an understanding of the r ecord and a 
correct understanding of the case authority and res 
judicata, we recognize, as I do, that the opinion and order 
of the California Central District Court which required 
Cendant to arbitrate with the Davidsons pr eceded any class 
certification and also preceded by approximately seven 
months any distribution of a class notice which pr escribed 
an opt-out period, then a completely differ ent and a correct 
result obtains. 
 
Accordingly, the proper course of action for the majority 
would have been to deal with the arbitration injunction 
first. If the majority then concluded, as I feel it should have, 
that the arbitration order both preceded and preempted the 
class action as to the Davidsons, then the issue of whether 
the Davidsons fit within the class definition is completely 
irrelevant because they could not have been class 
members. As I will discuss later, that is the only and the 
correct result of this appeal. In light of my conviction that 
the arbitration issue necessarily had to be decided before 
the issue of the Davidsons' inclusion in the class, I will 




The majority characterizes its holding with r espect to the 
New Jersey District Court's injunction of the Davidsons' 
arbitration as follows: "we hold that the District Court did 
err in enjoining, in its entirety, Appellants' arbitration. 
While Appellants are subject to the class settlement, and 
therefore are enjoined fr om pursuing any claims that fall 
within that settlement, they are not enjoined from pursuing, 
in arbitration, any claims that fall outside the settlement's 
scope." (Maj. Op. at 1 (emphasis added).) 
 
In discussing the arbitration injunction, the majority 
correctly cites language from the Supr eme Court 
emphasizing the preferred status of arbitration under the 
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). (Maj. Op. at 32.) However, 
because "Appellants . . . cite no case law holding that the 
FAA trumps, and thereby forgives,[the Davidsons'] failure 
to opt out," the majority holds that "the District Court did 
not violate the policies of the FAA when it enjoined 
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Appellants from proceeding with their arbitration after they 
did not opt out of the class." (Maj. Op. at 36.) Accordingly, 
the majority concludes that "the District Court could enjoin 
. . . claims in arbitration that were r esolved by the Class 
Action Settlement." (Maj. Op. at 36.) The majority could not 
be more wrong. 
 
Indeed, I strongly disagree with the majority's decision for 
several reasons. I would hold that the New Jersey District 
Court did abuse its discretion, indeed it gr ossly abused its 
discretion, in enjoining the arbitration and not giving effect 
to the California Central District Court's or der compelling 
arbitration, and I would hold that the entir e arbitration 




First, the majority wholly ignored the timing of the 
initiation of the arbitration and of the class action. Because 
of the importance of the various events, I note in the 
margin the timeline of these events and the dates on which 
they occurred.3 Further, I recite the chronology of the most 





December 14, 1998 Lead Plaintiffs file an Amended Consolidated Class 
       Action Complaint ("ACCAC") and move for class 
       certification. 
December 17, 1998 The Davidsons initiate arbitration against Cendant 
       pursuant to their Settlement Agreement. 
January 21, 1999 Cendant files suit in the District Court for the 
       Central District of California to enjoin the 
       arbitration (claiming that the Davidsons' claims 
       are barred by the Settlement Agreement). 
January 27, 1999 The New Jersey District Court grants the motion 
       for class certification. 
February 17, 1999 Cendant moves for a pr eliminary injunction of the 
       arbitration; the Davidsons move for summary 
       judgment on the injunction action. 
April 8, 1999 The California Central District Court dismisses 
       Cendant's injunction action and finds that the 
       Davidsons' claims must be arbitrated. 
April 1999 Cendant appeals the California Central District 
       Court's decision, and Cendant and the Davidsons 
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1) the Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint and 
       motion for class certification were filed on December 14, 
       1998; 
 
2) the Davidsons filed a Notice of Claims for arbitration 
       against Cendant on December 17, 1998; 
 
3) the class was certified on January 27, 1999; 
 
4) on April 8, 1999, the California Central District Court 
       issued an opinion and order declining to enjoin the 
       Davidsons' arbitration and finding that the Davidsons' 
       claims must be arbitrated; 
 
5) in October 1999, class notice was first  disseminated 
       and the opt-out period began (almost a year after the 
       Notice of Claims for arbitration was filed); 
 
6) the opt-out period for the class action expir ed on 
       December 27, 1999. 
 
The majority ignores the most salient fact--that the 
Davidsons initiated arbitration before  the class was certified 
--indeed, before any notice of certification was ever 
formulated or distributed. Despite this and despite the fact 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       agree to stay arbitration pending the Ninth 
       Circuit's resolution of the appeal. 
August 6, 1999 The New Jersey District Court or ders 
       dissemination of class notice. 
October 1999 Class notice is disseminated. 
December 17, 1999 A proposed settlement of the class action is 
       reached. 
December 27, 1999 The opt-out period for the class action expires. 
March 29, 2000 The New Jersey District Court grants preliminary 
       approval of the settlement of the class action. 
April 2000 The Davidsons file a motion in the New Jersey 
       District Court for clarification of the class to 
       exclude them or for extension of the opt-out 
       period. 
June 20, 2000 The New Jersey District Court enjoins the 
       Davidsons' arbitration and finds that they ar e 
       class members. 
August 15, 2000 The final settlement of the class action is approved 
       by the New Jersey District Court and class 
       members release all claims against Cendant. 
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that no case authority--I repeat, no case authority--exists 
which holds that an arbitration initiated prior to class 
certification, thereafter ordered by a federal district court, 
and on appeal to its Court of Appeals4  may be enjoined, the 
majority here nevertheless and perplexingly holds that the 
New Jersey District Court properly enjoined the Davidsons' 




The majority states that the District Court had authority 
to enjoin the Davidsons' arbitration under the All W rits Act, 
28 U.S.C. S 1651.5 The majority goes on, however, to make 
several points that contravene its own eventual holding: 1) 
that the Supreme Court, and the FAA,"require[ ] that 
arbitrable claims be arbitrated" in most cir cumstances; 2) 
that federal district courts may only enjoin state court 
proceedings and arbitrations under the All W rits Act in rare 
instances;6 and 3) that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 
S 2283, also limits the situations in which injunctions of 
other proceedings by federal district courts ar e permissible. 
(Maj. Op. at 31-39.) By making these points, the majority 
has, in effect, done much of my work for me. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The California Central District Court's order of April 8, 1999 is 
presently pending before the Ninth Cir cuit. 
5. Incidentally, the New Jersey District Court did not explicitly invoke 
the 
All Writs Act in enjoining the Davidsons' arbitration. I will assume, 
however, that the All Writs Act is where the District Court found its 
authority to issue the injunction, in light of the lack of such authority 
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pr ocedure itself. As the 
Second Circuit observed in In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.: 
 
       We do not find independent authority for the issuance of the 
       injunction in the Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(d) pr ovision empowering the 
       district judge to issue orders appropriate"for the protection of 
the 
       members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the 
action"; 
       that rule is a rule of procedure and cr eates no substantive rights 
or 
       remedies enforceable in federal court. 
 
770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 
6. We should not lose sight of the fact that, here, a federal district 
court 
in New Jersey enjoined a California arbitration after a California federal 
district court had previously denied Cendant's application to reject the 
Davidsons' arbitration claims. 
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Picking up after the majority's eloquent recitation of these 
points, one would expect that the majority would logically 
hold that the District Court's order enjoining the Davidsons' 
arbitration was without legal foundation and authority and 
must, therefore, be reversed. Inexplicably, the majority, 
without basis in reason and without support in the cases 
and statutes on which it relies, has err oneously held 




The All Writs Act states: "The Supr eme Court and all 
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs 
necessary or appropriate in aid of their r espective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of 
law." 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a). To explain why the majority erred 
in relying on the All Writs Act to support its affirming the 
District Court's injunction, I will flesh out in more detail 
the scope of the Act and the meaning of the phrase  
"necessary7 . . . in aid of . . . jurisdiction[ ]." 
 
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission, the Supreme Court stated: 
 
       The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a), is the only 
       source of this Court's authority to issue an injunction. 
       We have consistently stated, and our own Rules so 
       require, that such power is to be used sparingly. 
       "[J]udicial power to stay an act of Congr ess, like 
       judicial power to hold that act unconstitutional, is an 
       awesome responsibility calling for the utmost 
       circumspection in its exercise. . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Though the All Writs Act contains the phrase "necessary or appropriate 
in aid of . . . jurisdiction[ ]," 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a) (emphasis added), 
the 
scope of authority to issue injunctions under the Act is necessarily 
limited by the Anti-Injunction Act, which pr ovides that "[a] court of the 
United States may not grant an injunction to stay pr oceedings in a State 
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where 
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to pr otect or effectuate its 
judgments." 28 U.S.C. S 2283. Therefor e, the appropriate inquiry under 
the All Writs Act in conjunction with the Anti-Injunction Act is whether 
the injunction is "necessary in aid of . . . jurisdiction." (Emphasis 
added). 
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       An injunction is appropriate only if (1) it is"necessary 
       or appropriate in aid of [our] jurisdictio[n]," 28 U.S.C. 
       S 1651(a), and (2) the legal rights at issue are 
       "indisputably clear." 
 
507 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1993) (internal citations omitted). 
 
In sanctioning the New Jersey District Court's injunction 
as authorized under the All Writs Act, the majority 
erroneously relies on several cases.8 First, the majority 
misapplies In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 770 F.2d 328 
(2d Cir. 1985). In Baldwin-United, the district court had 
issued an injunction against state court actions under the 
All Writs Act, stating that "the injunction was necessary `in 
aid of preserving [the court's] jurisdiction.' " 770 F.2d at 
333 (quoting 28 U.S.C. S 1651). The district court had 
found that "the existence of competitive litigation . . . would 
jeopardize its ability to rule on the settlements, would 
substantially increase the cost of litigation, would create a 
risk of conflicting results, and would pr event the plaintiffs 
from benefiting from any settlement alr eady negotiated or 
from reaching a new and improved settlement in the federal 
court." 770 F.2d at 333. 
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of 
a preliminary injunction in Baldwin-United , observing that 
an injunction is proper under the All W rits Act when 
"necessary to prevent a state court fr om so interfering with 
a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as to 
seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority 
to decide that case." 770 F.2d at 335 (quoting Atlantic Coast 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The majority also perplexingly contradicts itself in its discussions of 
the FAA and the Anti-Injunction Act. It corr ectly observes that "the 
Supreme Court requires that arbitrable claims be arbitrated, even where 
the result would be the possible inefficient maintenance of separate 
proceedings in different forums," and it points out that "the FAA requires 
piecemeal resolution when necessary to give ef fect to an arbitration 
agreement." (Maj. Op. at 32 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).) However, only two pages later , the majority contradicts this 
mandate, averring in its discussion of the Anti-Injunction Act that "a 
class action calls for distinct rules in connection with the need to have 
as many common issues as possible disposed of in a single proceeding." 
(Maj. Op. at 34.) This statement is simply incorr ect in the context of 
this 
case, in light of FAA and Anti-Injunction Act jurisprudence. 
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Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 
U.S. 281, 295 (1970) (dicta)). The Second Cir cuit held that 
this standard was met in Baldwin-United because "[t]he 
existence of multiple and harassing actions by the states 
could only serve to frustrate the district court's efforts to 
craft a settlement in the multidistrict litigation before it 
[because t]he success of any federal settlement was 
dependent on the parties' ability to agree to the release of 
any and all related civil claims the plaintif fs had against the 
settling defendants based on the same facts," which release 
would be uncertain "[i]f states or others could derivatively 
assert the same claims on behalf of the same class or 
members of it." 770 F.2d at 337. 
 
The holding in Baldwin-United that an injunction was 
proper under the All Writs Act is wholly inapplicable to this 
case for several reasons. First, it concer ned derivative 
lawsuits in state courts by the states themselves, not 
arbitration by an individual under the FAA. Second, the 
lawsuits were commenced after the class settlement was 
reached, contrasted with the Davidsons' arbitration, which 
was initiated before the CalPERS class was even certified. 
Finally, whereas the district court in Baldwin-United 
properly held that the injunction was necessary to preserve 
its jurisdiction under the All Writs Act because of the 
dangers to the class settlement from these derivative 
lawsuits, an injunction of the Davidsons' arbitration is not 
necessary to the settlement of the claims of the other 
CalPERS class members because the settlement of the class 
action here is not at all contingent on the Davidsons' 
participation in the class action. Moreover , the Davidsons 
have already received a final judgment in their favor from a 
competent court--the California Central District Court-- 
holding their claims to be arbitrable. (I discuss this issue of 
res judicata hereafter.) 
 
The majority also cites In re PaineW ebber Partnership 
Litig., 1996 WL 374162 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1996), a case that 
the District Court relied upon in enjoining the arbitration. 
The majority observes that, in PaineWebber, "the court 
denied fifteen plaintiffs' attempts to arbitrate claims covered 
by a class action where they all failed to opt out of the class 
before the deadline," a situation which the majority 
apparently likens to the instant case. (Maj. Op. at 32.) 
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In PaineWebber, after the opt-out period had expired and 
a tentative settlement had been reached, fifteen class 
members who had failed to opt out initiated separate state 
court litigation and arbitration, both covering similar claims 
to those in the class action. Relying on Baldwin-United, the 
district court enjoined the state litigation and the 
arbitration under the All Writs Act, observing that such an 
injunction was appropriate "where a federal court is on the 
verge of settling a complex matter, and state court 
proceedings may undermine its ability to achieve that 
objective." 1996 WL 374162, at 3 (quoting Standard 
Microsystems Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 
60 (2d Cir. 1990). The district court further noted that "this 
consolidated class action is analogous to a r es over which 
the Court requires full control, ther eby justifying a stay 
pursuant to the All Writs and Anti-Injunction Acts, at least 
to the extent that parties to this litigation seek to bring a 
new action in a different forum." 1996 WL 374162, at 3. 
 
In fact and in law, PaineWebber is wholly inapposite to 
this case, and I fail to understand why the majority has 
relied upon it. In PaineWebber, the plaintiffs did not seek 
arbitration until after the class had been certified, after 
notice of the class action had been sent out, after the opt- 
out period had expired, and after a tentative settlement of 
the class action had been reached. The observations by the 
district court in PaineWebber that"the Court has the ability 
to enjoin further litigation by class members involving the 
subject matter of this class action," 1996 WL 374162, at 4 
(S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1996) (emphasis added), and that an 
injunction was proper "to the extent that parties to this 
litigation seek to bring a new action in a different forum," 
1996 WL 374162, at 3 (emphasis added), have no r elevance 
or application here, where the Davidsons' arbitration did 
not constitute "further litigation" or "a new action" but 
rather was commenced before class certification and was 
confirmed as the appropriate course of action by a federal 
district court in California long befor e class notice was 
disseminated. Accordingly, the reasoning employed by the 
district court in PaineWebber to issue an injunction under 
the All Writs Act cannot be used to justify the injunction 
here. 
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Another case cited by the majority, In r e Joint Eastern 
and Southern Districts Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990), concerned consolidation of asbestos- 
related proceedings against the defendant. Class counsel 
and the defendant reached a proposed settlement, after 
which "the court directed that all inter ested parties appear 
. . . and show cause why the proposed class should not be 
certified and asbestos-related proceedings in other forums 
stayed." 134 F.R.D. at 35. After these hearings, a class 
action complaint and motion for certification wasfiled, 
which motion was granted by the court in conjunction with 
a stay of "any pending asbestos-related pr oceedings 
brought on behalf of class members." 134 F .R.D. at 35. 
 
In asserting that the injunction in Asbestos was 
"necessary and appropriate in aid of " the district court's 
jurisdiction of the class action under the All W rits Act, the 
district court pointed out that: 
 
       To permit pending actions against [the defendant] to 
       proceed in their present form would substantially 
       impair or impede the interests of other asbestos 
       claimants and would significantly deplete the assets 
       available to resolve all pending and futur e cases. These 
       pending cases, if allowed to continue independently, 
       will seriously hinder the ability of the court to evaluate 
       the adequacy and fairness of the proposed settlement 
       of the class action by constantly depleting [the 
       defendant]'s assets. 
 
134 F.R.D. at 36. In addition, the district court in Asbestos 
described asbestos litigation as having reached"crisis 
proportions." Specifically, the district court observed: 
 
       Over 100,000 pending asbestos personal injury and 
       wrongful death cases have backlogged the courts-- 
       preventing many injured persons fr om obtaining much 
       needed compensation in a timely and efficient manner. 
       Even more troubling is the current r ealization that 
       each day, as more judgments are paid, the possibility 
       that similarly situated claimants will not r eceive the 
       full value of their claims becomes increasingly likely. A 
       fundamental tenet of our legal system--equal 
       treatment--no longer exists for asbestos victims. 
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134 F.R.D. at 33. 
 
To suggest that the necessity of enjoining the Davidsons' 
arbitration is even remotely comparable to the national 
"crisis" of asbestos litigation is preposterous. The District 
Court in this case was not faced with hundreds of 
thousands of individual actions threatening to impair the 
settlement of the class action before it. Indeed, the District 
Court was faced with only a single arbitration pr oceeding 
that had been decided and was on appeal in another 
Circuit, that had been commenced before class certification 
pursuant to arbitration agreements between Cendant and 
the Davidsons, and that made claims available to no other 
Cendant shareholders. In other words, wher eas the 
injunction in Asbestos served to stay countless actions by 
class members, which actions could of course seriously 
impact the possibility and quality of settlement of the class 
action, the District Court here enjoined one arbitration 
arising out of circumstances peculiar to the Davidsons and 
which could not have any imaginable impact on the 
administration and disposition of other class members' 
claims. 
 
The case before us simply does not meet the 
requirements for issuance of an injunction under the All 
Writs Act, and none, I repeat, none, of the cases that the 
majority cites furnishes even a modicum of authority for 
the conclusion that the majority desires to r each. Unlike 
Baldwin-United, PaineWebber, and Asbestos, the injunction 
issued by the New Jersey District Court was not"necessary 
in aid of its jurisdiction." The Davidsons initiated their 
arbitration against Cendant under an agreement between 
the Davidsons and Cendant not applicable to other class 
members and, as will be discussed infra, the claims in their 
arbitration overlapped only slightly with the claims in the 
class action. In addition, there is no thr eat that allowing 
this arbitration, initiated before class certification and long 
before expiration of the opt-out period, to pr oceed would 
expose Cendant to future claims by other putative class 
members, because such claims would necessarily be 
commenced much later in the course of the class action 
and would therefore be more analogous to the cases relied 
upon by the majority and discussed above. 
 
                                52 
  
The arbitration would neither "interfer[e] with [the New 
Jersey District Court's] consideration or disposition" of the 
class action, nor would it "seriously impair the[New Jersey 
District Court's] flexibility to decide" the class action, nor 
would it "undermine [the New Jersey District Court's] 
ability to achieve" class settlement. Baldwin-United, 770 
F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985); PaineWebber, 1996 WL 
374162, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1996). Accor dingly, I 
fervently disagree with the majority's holding that the New 
Jersey District Court had authority to enjoin the arbitration 




Because the Davidsons initiated arbitration so early, 
indeed before the class had even been certified, those cases 
cited by the majority which permit injunctions of 
arbitrations initiated by class members at the time when 
the class action is nearing settlement are just not 
applicable to this appeal, and the majority has err ed 
grievously in attempting to support its holding based on 
such authority. In light of the fact that the Davidsons 
commenced arbitration pursuant to unique agr eements 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The majority cites still another case, In re Prudential Partnership 
Litig., 
158 F.R.D. 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), which it claims bolsters its 
unsupportable conclusion that one district court can enjoin an 
arbitration that another district court has ruled must go forward. In re 
Prudential does not invoke the All Writs Act but should be discussed 
briefly because it too is completely distinguishable from the instant 
case. 
The court in In re Prudential Partnership Litig. stated: "Class members 
who wish to opt out in order to . . . seek arbitration in a forum in 
existence at the time of the original opt-out deadline have no excuse for 
their neglect to opt out; they are simply seeking to escape consequences 
known to them at the time they chose to remain in the class." 158 
F.R.D. 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); (See Maj. Op. at 36). By contrast, in 
this case, the Davidsons did not "wish to opt out in order to . . . seek 
arbitration." They had already sought arbitration almost a year before the 
opt-out period even began and over a year before the expiration of the 
opt- 
out period and, most importantly, had received a final judgment in their 
favor. This is not a case in which the Davidsons received notice of the 
class settlement and then suddenly decided to arbitrate their claims 
instead of participating in the settlement. Rather , they sought to compel 
arbitration before the class was even certified. 
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between themselves and Cendant, the majority's holding 
that the injunction was "necessary . . . in aid of " the 
District Court's jurisdiction under the All W rits Act is 
equally untenable. Indeed, the one case wher e the facts are 
analogous to this appeal, in that the arbitration 
commenced before the class was certified and notices were 
distributed, is the Eighth Circuit case of In re Piper Funds, 
Inc., Inst. Gov't Income Portfolio Litig., 71 F .3d 298 (8th Cir. 
1995), a case relying on the FAA rather than the All Writs 
Act to reverse a district court's injunction of an arbitration 
initiated before class certification. 
 
In Piper Funds, the Eighth Circuit held that the district 
court had improperly enjoined an arbitration commenced, 
as here, before class certification and before the notice of 
class action had been disseminated and the opt-out period 
had begun. Piper Funds differs slightly from this case in 
that the plaintiff in Piper Funds, Park Nicollet, had 
specifically expressed its desire to opt out of the class 
before the opt-out period had even begun. The Eighth 
Circuit pointed out that "the FAA does not authorize a 
district court to enjoin arbitration" and observed that "there 
are very few reported cases in which a federal court has 
enjoined arbitration." 71 F.3d at 302. It listed three reasons 
why the district court's reasons for the injunction were not 
sufficient, all of which are equally applicable in this case: 1) 
"Park Nicollet has a contractual right to immediate 
submission of its securities law claims to arbitration," 71 
F.3d at 303; 2) "Park Nicollet's contractual and statutory 
right to arbitrate may not be sacrificed on the altar of 
efficient class action management," 71 F .3d at 303; and 3) 
the Court did not accept "the class action parties' 
conclusory assertion that immediate arbitration by Park 
Nicollet (and perhaps others) will frustrate their class action 
settlement." 71 F.3d at 303. 
 
Though relying on the FAA to hold that the district 
court's injunction of the arbitration had been in error, the 
Eighth Circuit did address the All W rits Act, stating: 
 
       The district court based its injunction on the All W rits 
       Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1651, which has been invoked by 
       federal class action courts to enjoin persons not within 
       the court's jurisdiction from frustrating a court order 
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       or court-supervised settlement. We agr ee with the 
       district court that it has the power, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
       23 augmented by the All Writs Act, to contr ol conduct 
       by absent class members that affects management or 
       disposition of the class action. However, exercise of this 
       power must be "agreeable to the usages and principles 
       of law," S 1651(a), which in this case include the FAA 
       as well as Rule 23. 
 
71 F.3d at 300 n.2 (internal citations omitted). 
 
To put the Eighth Circuit's holding mor e firmly in the 
context of the All Writs Act, the FAA's clear preference for 
arbitration over other forms of litigation dictates that an 
injunction can never be appropriate in a case such as this 
one because "the legal rights at issue [can never be] 
`indisputably clear' " where issuance of an injunction would 
violate the principles of the FAA, and, ther efore, the second 
prong of the test of the propriety of an injunction, set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Turner Br oadcasting System, Inc. 
v. Federal Communications Commission, can never be met. 
 
It is true that the Court in Piper Funds noted in dictum 
that the district court may properly have denied the party's 
request to opt out if, for example, "its r equest to opt out 
was too late." 71 F.3d at 304. The majority seizes upon that 
language as reason enough to justify its holding in this 
case, disregarding the Eighth Circuit's indisputable 
reasoning that it is inappropriate under the FAA for a 
district court to enjoin a previously initiated arbitration 
simply because the party did not follow the standar d opt- 
out procedure. (See Maj. Op. at 35-36.) However, the 
majority's willful blindness to the similarities between this 
case and Piper Funds is just another example of the 
majority's unwillingness to accept the fact that the 
arbitration sought by the Davidsons preempted any class 
membership and could not be enjoined. 
 
In fact, in both this case and Piper Funds, the plaintiffs 
did not follow the standard opt-out procedure. In Piper 
Funds, the plaintiff attempted to opt out before the opt-out 
period had begun, and, here, the Davidsons initiated 
arbitration well before the opt-out period began but did not 
explicitly opt out of the class. The Davidsons did not opt 
 
                                55 
  
out at that time, undoubtedly because neither the 
Davidsons nor Cendant believed that the Davidsons were 
class members. Moreover, when the Davidsons filed their 
motion in the District Court seeking clarification of the 
class definition, the Lead Plaintiffs filed a brief stating that 
"Lead Plaintiffs agree that the Davidsons are excluded from 
the class." (App. 918.) The Davidsons obviously could not 
have been found to be members of the class if the District 
Court had honored the California District Court's order 
compelling arbitration.10 
 
Moreover, the majority errs in r elying on In re VMS Sec. 
Litig., 21 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 1994), to support its point that 
a late opt-out terminates a party's right to arbitrate. 
Though, as the majority notes, the plaintiffs in VMS "had 
obtained an award in the arbitration filed before resolution 
of the class action," (Maj. Op. at 35), the pr ogression of 
events in that case differed markedly fr om this case. In 
VMS, class actions were filed and consolidated into one 
class action, and a proposed settlement was approved, 
subject to notice to class members, hearing, andfinal 
approval. Then, the Hubbards initiated arbitration. 
Subsequently, class notice was disseminated and the opt- 
out period expired without the Hubbards opting out. The 
district court then enjoined the Hubbards' arbitration, but 
the arbitrators heard the Hubbards' claims anyway and 
granted them an award. 
 
The Seventh Circuit held that "[t]he arbitrators `exceeded 
their power' when they decided to act on the Hubbar ds' 
claims [because t]he Hubbards' claims against Prudential 
arising from their investment in the VMS Mortgage 
Investment Fund were subject to the class action 
settlement, and had already been resolved." VMS, 21 F.3d 
at 145. Indeed, the claims in VMS had been r esolved in the 




10. Additionally, in Section IV, infra , I discuss the New Jersey District 
Court's failure to comply with this court's dir ections in noting that, 
after 
the California arbitration had been enjoined, the Davidsons were too late 
to opt out of the class. The District Court failed to apply the Supreme 
Court's Pioneer analysis and our instructions in its opinion. 
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By contrast, the Davidsons' arbitration commenced 
before the class was even certified. Additionally, the 
Davidsons initiated arbitration pursuant to br oad and 
binding arbitration agreements (see Part II.C.2, infra),11the 
predominance of which had already been confirmed by a 
federal district court in California, wher eas the Hubbards' 
arbitration was not pursuant to such an agreement.12 
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit's opinion in VMS 
understandably contained no reference to the guiding 
principles of the FAA. Because of these significant 
differences between VMS and this case, the Seventh 
Circuit's decision that the Hubbards wer e bound to the 
class settlement after they failed to opt out has no 
relevance to the instant case. Indeed, I have no quarrel with 
the VMS decision and might very well have joined in the 
VMS holding if that case were befor e me. 
 
By asserting that the Davidsons' right to arbitrate is not 
extinguished by their failure to opt out of the class, I am 
not "gloss[ing] over" the Eighth Cir cuit's statement in Piper 
Funds regarding late opt outs as the majority suggests. 
(Maj. Op. at 36.) I am simply affording more importance to 
the Eighth Circuit's actual holdings r egarding the 
predominance of the FAA than to itsfleeting statement in 
dictum regarding late opt-outs. The majority, by contrast, 
has attempted to support and justify its holding her e by 
resorting to odd and assorted dicta from the cases which it 
has cited and I have distinguished, all of which, other than 
Piper Funds, are irrelevant to the issue presented here of 
arbitration preceding class action. (See  Maj. at 35-36 
(quoting In re VMS Sec. Litig., 21 F .3d 139 (7th Cir. 1994); 
In re PaineWebber P'ship Litig., 1996 WL 374162 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 1, 1996); In re Prudential P'ship Litig., 158 F.R.D. 301 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).) 
 
I believe, as I have earlier stated, that the only case 
relevant to the issue before us is Piper Funds, which, while 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Singularly, the majority opinion makes no mention of the terms and 
breadth of the arbitration agreements entered into by the Davidsons and 
Cendant in its discussion and analysis. 
 
12. In addition, as will be discussed in Part III infra, the class 
settlement 
here did not "resolve" the Davidsons' claims. 
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not binding on us in the Third Circuit, nonetheless, with 
unimpeachable reasoning, supports a holding that, under 
the FAA, and despite the All Writs Act, the New Jersey 
District Court could not have and should not have enjoined 






The Davidsons argue that the New Jersey District Court 
should have given res judicata effect to the decision by the 
California Central District Court. In addr essing this 
argument by the Davidsons, the New Jersey District Court 
stated: 
 
       Plaintiffs' assertion that the Court is r es judicata- 
       barred from hearing this action is meritless. The 
       Central District of California was not pr esented with 
       the issue before this Court--whether the Davidsons are 
       within the CalPERS settling class. While the Court 
       directed arbitration of claims arising fr om the 1996 
       acquisition and 1997 Settlement Agreement, that 
       direction was made under different factual (and 
       procedural) circumstances. As Cendant says, it did not 
       argue that the Davidsons were class members--at 
       most, they were potential members. Obviously, that 
       issue was not before the Central District of California 
       impliedly or actually. 
 
194 F.R.D. 158, 166 (D.N.J. 2000). I believe that the New 
Jersey District Court incorrectly applied the doctrine of res 
judicata and that the Davidsons are corr ect that the 
California Central District Court's decision precluded the 
New Jersey District Court from enjoining the Davidsons' 
arbitration. 
 
Initially, I should explain that there ar e two forms of 
preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata: claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion (also r eferred to as 
collateral estoppel). As the Third Circuit stated in In re 
Graham: 
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       Claim preclusion applies to claims that `wer e or could 
       have been raised' in a prior action involving the`parties 
       or their privies' when the prior action had been 
       resolved by `a final judgment on the merits.' Claim 
       preclusion thus bars relitigation of any claim that 
       could have been raised in the prior action even if it was 
       not so raised. 
 
In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1093 (3d Cir.1992) (internal 
citations omitted). Issue preclusion, on the other hand, 
"bars relitigation only of an issue identical to that 
adjudicated in the prior action." Witkowski v. Welch, 173 
F.3d 192, 198 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999); see also In re Braen, 900 
F.2d 621, 628-29 n. 5 (3d Cir.1990). 
 
Here, we are considering Cendant's motion for an 
injunction of the arbitration, a motion made in both 
California and in New Jersey. The Califor nia Central 
District Court dismissed Cendant's action seeking an 
injunction, and that decision is currently on appeal before 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.13  The decision of the 
California Central District Court constitutes a "final 
judgment on the merits" and that the doctrine of claim 
preclusion applies to that decision. 
 
The Supreme Court has described the doctrine of claim 
preclusion as follows: "A final judgment on the merits of an 
action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating 
issues that were or could have been raised in that action." 
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 
398 (1981). Therefore, it must be deter mined whether 
Cendant's motion for an injunction of the Davidsons' 
arbitration in the New Jersey District Court was"or could 
have been raised" in the California Central District Court. 
 
Cendant's complaint before the California Central District 
Court asking the court to enjoin the arbitration was based 
solely on the several agreements between Cendant and the 
Davidsons and did not mention the issue of the Davidsons' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Under federal law, a judgment on appeal is still a final judgment for 
res judicata purposes. See Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating 
Co., 312 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1941); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea 
Boliviana, 99 F.3d 538, 540 (2d Cir . 1996). 
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putative class membership at all. In addition, as the New 
Jersey District Court pointed out, the issue of the 
Davidsons' class membership could not have been before 
the California Central District Court because, at the time of 
the California Central District Court's decision, the opt-out 
period had not even begun and, therefor e, the Davidsons 
had not yet irrevocably failed to opt out of the class action. 
 
The New Jersey District Court found this distinguishing 
feature to be dispositive of the res judicata question, as 
does the majority here, which describes the fact that the 
Davidsons' putative class membership was not addr essed 
in the California injunction action as a "fatal flaw." (Maj. 
Op. at 30-31 n.22.) Indeed, the New Jersey District Court 
reasoned that, because the Davidsons' class membership 
"was not before the Central District of California impliedly 
or actually," 194 F.R.D. at 166, the California court's 
decision that the Davidsons' could not be enjoined did not 
preclude the New Jersey District Court fr om enjoining the 
arbitration after the expiration of the opt-out period. 
 
However, it is the New Jersey District Court's and the 
majority's analyses, not mine, that are fatallyflawed. What 
the New Jersey District Court and the majority fail to 
realize is that the Davidsons' class membership is irrelevant 
to the issue of whether to enjoin the arbitration. Because of 
the timing of the arbitration and the class action and 
because of the lack of authority to enjoin the Davidsons' 
arbitration under the All Writs Act, all discussed in detail in 
the preceding sections, the New Jersey District Court could 
not base its authority to issue an injunction on the 
(arguable) fact of the Davidsons' class membership. 
Therefore, contrary to the majority's position, it is far from 
"spurious to suggest that res judicata pr ecludes the District 
Court from deciding whether Appellants' claims could be 
decided in the class action." (Maj. Op. at 30-31 n.22.) The 
issue before the New Jersey District Court, whether to 
enjoin the Davidsons' arbitration at Cendant's r equest, was 
precisely the same issue that was befor e the California 
Central District Court and that the California court decided 
more than a year before the New Jersey District Court dealt 
with the issue. Thus, it is completely irrelevant that 
"Cendant's complaint [in the California Central District 
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Court] . . . did not interpose the existence of the class 
action as a ground for seeking injunctive r elief from the 
arbitration." (Maj. Op. at 9.) 
 
Because the injunction issues before the California and 
New Jersey courts were the same, the New Jersey District 
Court was required to afford the decision of the California 
court res judicata effect. The Califor nia Central District 
Court held that, with regard to the Davidsons' claims 
regarding rescission of the Settlement Agreement, "[t]he 
Supreme Court has held that an arbitrator must resolve a 
claim to rescind a contract based upon fraud in the 
inducement when the contract contains a broad arbitration 
provision." (App. 705 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1967).) The court 
also held that the remaining claims, regar ding the merger 
of CUC and DAI, should also be submitted to arbitration 
because "whether or not the claims were r eleased depends 
on whether the settlement agreement can be r escinded, and 
depends also on the scope of the release in the agreement. 
Both of these issues must be determined by an arbitrator, 
pursuant to the clear intent of the parties to submit such 
disputes to binding arbitration." (App. 706.) This clear 
holding by the California Central District Court left no room 
for the New Jersey District Court to enjoin the Davidsons' 
arbitration, and the New Jersey District Court err ed in 
doing so. The majority has similarly erred in upholding the 




It is worth mentioning briefly that a review of the 
arbitration clauses in the February 19, 1996 Mer ger 
Agreement and the May 27, 1997 Settlement Agr eement 
between the Davidsons and Cendant makes clear that the 
California Central District Court's decision to dismiss 
Cendant's injunction action and to allow the arbitration to 
go forward was the correct decision. The arbitration clause 
in the Merger Agreement states: "Any controversy, dispute 
or claim arising out of or relating to this Agr eement or the 
breach hereof which cannot be settled by mutual agreement 
. . . shall be finally settled by arbitration . . ." (App. 524.) 
The clause goes on to state that "[t]he decision of the 
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arbitrator on the points in dispute will be final, 
unappealable and binding and judgment on the awar d may 
be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof." (App. 
524.) Additionally, the clause states: 
 
       The parties agree that this clause has been included to 
       rapidly and inexpensively resolve any disputes between 
       them with respect to this Agreement, and that this 
       clause shall be grounds for dismissal of any court action 
       commenced by either party with respect to this 
       Agreement, other than post-arbitration actions seeking 
       to enforce an arbitration award. 
 
(App. 524-25 (emphasis added). 
 
The Settlement Agreement contains similar language. The 
agreement to arbitrate states: 
 
       Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in 
       this Agreement or the Surviving Agreements and 
       Rights, any controversy, dispute or claims arising out 
       of or relating to this Agreement or any of the Surviving 
       Agreements and Rights or the breach her eof or thereof 
       which cannot be settled by mutual agreement shall be 
       finally settled by binding arbitration in accor dance with 
       the Federal Arbitration Act . . . 
 
(App. 668.) The arbitration clause in the Settlement 
Agreement also states that "[t]he decision of the arbitrator 
on the points in dispute will be final, unappealable and 
binding, and judgment on the award may be enter ed in any 
court having jurisdiction thereof." (App. 669.) Finally, as in 
the Merger Agreement, the arbitration clause in the 
Settlement Agreement states: 
 
       The parties agree that this Section has been included 
       to rapidly and inexpensively resolve any disputes 
       between them with respect to this Agreement or any of 
       the Surviving Agreements and Rights, and that this 
       Section shall be grounds for dismissal of any court 
       action commenced by any party with respect to this 
       Agreement or any of the Surviving Agr eements and 
       Rights, other than post-arbitration actions seeking to 
       enforce an arbitrator award. 
 
(App. 669-70 (emphasis added).) 
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In their Notice of Claims for arbitration, the Davidsons 
raised claims in connection with both the Mer ger 
Agreement and the Settlement Agreement. They explicitly 
invoked both arbitration clauses in support of arbitrating 
these claims, stating that "[t]his dispute pr operly is before 
this arbitration tribunal by virtue of an arbitration 
provision set forth in the Settlement Agr eement between the 
Davidsons and CUC," and "[t]his dispute also is properly 
before this arbitration tribunal by virtue of an arbitration 
provision set forth in . . . the `Mer ger Agreement.' " (App. 
535-36.) The Davidsons also cited similarly wor ded 
arbitration provisions in their Employment Agr eements with 
CUC and in their Noncompetition Agreements with CUC in 
support of arbitrating their claims. (App. 537-38.) 
 
These broad arbitration clauses clearly pr eclude a court 
from mandating that the Davidsons participate in a class 
action concerning the claims for which they sought 
arbitration, and the clauses support the Califor nia Central 




One final point in connection with the preclusive effect of 
the California Central District Court's decision: in light of 
the California court's clear holding that the arbitration 
could not be enjoined, the majority misapplies our decision 
in Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 
(3d Cir. 1997). This court held in Peacock: "Once a dispute 
is determined to be validly arbitrable, all other issues are to 
be decided at arbitration. . . . It would be anomalous for a 
court to decide that a claim should be referr ed to an 
arbitrator rather than a court, and then, by deciding issues 
unrelated to the question of forum, for eclose the arbitrator 
from deciding them." 110 F.3d at 230-31.9 
 
The majority perplexingly fails to realize that the dispute 
between the Davidsons and Cendant has already been 
"determined to be validly arbitrable" by the California 
Central District Court. Accordingly, it is"anomalous" and 
indeed erroneous for the majority here to issue this opinion 
which clearly "foreclose[s] the arbitrator from deciding" the 
very issues raised in the arbitration, which a competent 
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Because of the timing of the Davidsons' commencement 
of the arbitration and the initiation of the class action, 
because of the fact that the requirements of the All Writs 
Act were not met in this case for issuance of an injunction, 
because of this case's dissimilarity to Baldwin-United, 
PaineWebber, and Asbestos and its similarity to Piper 
Funds, and because of the appropriate application of the 
doctrine of res judicata to this case, ther e can be no doubt 
that the New Jersey District Court grossly abused its 
discretion in enjoining the Davidsons' arbitration. 
 
Accordingly, I am satisfied that, at this point, the issue of 
whether the Davidsons can be deemed to fall within the 
class definition is irrelevant. The Davidsons sought 
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses in the 
Merger Agreement and the Settlement Agr eement, and the 
California Central District Court confir med that arbitration 
was proper. As noted earlier, that order is presently on 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir cuit and 
should have been given res judicata effect by the New 
Jersey District Court. The only way the issue of the 
Davidsons' class membership could become relevant is if 
the Ninth Circuit reversed the Califor nia Central District 
Court's decision and held that the Davidsons' claims were 
not properly before the arbitrator . Because of that remote 
possibility, I will nonetheless discuss below the issue of the 




The majority holds that the District Court did not err in 
finding that the Davidsons were within the class definition. 
It bases its holding in part on its interpretation of the term 
"publicly traded" in the class definition, which the majority 
reads to include the Cendant shares acquir ed by the 
Davidsons in the Merger Agreement. The majority concedes 
that there were restrictions placed on the Davidsons' sales 
of the stock they acquired in the Merger Agreement, but 
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observes that "[t]he restriction on sale of the CUC stock 
held by Appellants emanated solely from the quantity of 
shares they received as a result of the merger, not in any 
way from the type of security they received." (Maj. Op. at 
16.) 
 
Further, the majority notes that the r estrictions on the 
Davidsons' sale of their shares "could be avoided entirely 
. . . if Appellants were to sell shares of CUC stock under 
any subsequent registration statement." (Maj. Op. at 17.) 
Accordingly, the majority reaches the conclusion--a 
conclusion for which no relevant authority is cited--that 
the Davidsons' shares were "publicly traded," asserting that 
"[h]aving traded publicly tens of millions of shares of CUC 
common stock so soon after the DAI merger , and then to 
claim that they are not `publicly traded' securities within 
the class definition, is a non sequitur." (Maj. Op. at 17.) 
 
I cannot agree with the majority's holding on this issue, 
because the Davidsons' shares were not"publicly traded," 
and I would hold that the District Court and the majority 
of this court have erred in holding otherwise. 
 
Pursuant to the Agreement and Plan of Mer ger of DAI 
and CUC, shares of DAI were to be converted as follows: 
"each share of common stock, par value $0.00025 per 
share, of [DAI] issued and outstanding immediately prior to 
the Effective Time . . . shall, by virtue of the Merger . . . be 
converted into and shall become 0.85 of one fully paid and 
nonassessable share of common stock, $.01 par value per 
share, of [CUC]." (App. 475.) The Agr eement was entered 
into on February 19, 1996. Also on that date, the 
Davidsons signed letters upon which the merger was 
conditioned. The letters stated, inter alia: 
 
       I hereby represent, warrant and covenant to [CUC] 
       that: 
 
       (a) I will not transfer, sell or otherwise dispose of any 
       of the [CUC] shares except (i) pursuant to an effective 
       registration statement under the Securities Act, or (ii) 
       as permitted by, and in accordance with, Rule 145, if 
       applicable, or another applicable exemption under the 
       Securities Act; and 
 
                                65 
  
       (b) I will not (i) transfer, sell, or otherwise dispose of 
       any [DAI] Shares prior to the Effective Time (as defined 
       in the Merger Agreement) or (ii) sell or otherwise reduce 
       my risk (within the meaning of the Securities and 
       Exchange Commission's Financial Reporting Release 
       No. 1, "Codification of Financial Reporting Policies," 
       Section 201.01 [47 F.R. 21028] (May 17, 1982) with 
       respect to any [CUC] shares until after such time (the 
       "Delivery Time") as consolidated financial statements 
       which reflect at least 30 days of post-mer ger combined 
       operations of [CUC] and [DAI] have been published by 
       [CUC], except as permitted by Staf f Accounting Bulletin 
       No. 76 issued by the Securities and Exchange 
       Commission. 
 
(App. 1129, 1131.) 
 
In light of these limitations on the Davidsons' shar es, the 
District Court clearly erred in finding that they were 
"publicly traded," and the majority compounded that error 
by subscribing to the District Court's ruling. The 
Davidsons' shares were certainly "common stock," but not 
all common stock is necessarily "publicly traded." The 
Merger Agreement placed restrictions on the Davidsons' 
trading of their CUC shares, differ entiating them from freely 
and publicly traded CUC common stock. Further , there is 
no basis for the majority's speculative assertion that the 
restrictions were entered into because of the quantity, and 
not the quality, of the shares. Regardless of the reason, 
there were restrictions on the Davidsons' shares of CUC 
common stock, and, therefore, those shar es were not 
"publicly traded." 
 
Nor am I convinced by the majority's argument that the 
Davidsons could have avoided the restrictions on their 
shares by selling under subsequent registration statements. 
The fact that the Davidsons were able to over come the 
restriction on their shares (in other wor ds, that the 
restriction did not amount to an absolute pr ohibition on 
trading) does not suddenly transform the r estricted shares 
which are not publicly traded into "publicly traded 
securities." Whether the restriction made the Davidsons' 
shares wholly untradeable or tradeable only after some 
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maneuvering, the fact remains that the shar es simply were 
not "publicly traded securities." 
 
I agree with the majority that the Davidsons meet the 
class definition in other respects, because they "purchased 
or otherwise acquired" their shares within the relevant time 
period, they were "injured ther eby," and they are not 
"officers and directors of Cendant." However, the dispositive 
point, and the point on which I diverge fr om the majority, 
is the majority's position that the Davidsons' shar es are 
"publicly traded securities." "Publicly traded securities" is 
the cornerstone of "class membership" as the class was 
certified. Because the Davidsons' shares wer e not "publicly 
traded," they do not meet the class definition. Accordingly, 
the District Court erred in finding the Davidsons to be class 
members, even according "particular defer ence" to the 
District Court on this finding.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The majority uses the "particular defer ence" standard of review in 
referring to the District Court's interpr etations of the District Court's 
own orders. I do not think that it is appr opriate to accord the District 
Court "particular deference" on this issue because I do not believe that 
the District Court's finding as to the Davidsons' membership in the class 
amounted to an "interpretation of its own or der." The majority asserts 
that, "[h]ere, the District Court, in determining whether Appellants were 
class members, interpreted its own orders, the order certifying the class 
and the order approving the class notice, both of which contained the 
class definition." (Maj. Op. at 14-15.) In so holding, the majority 
accords 
a "particular deference" to the District Court's interpretations. 
 
While it is true that those orders gave content to the class definition, 
the District Court did not draft the definition itself. I believe that 
"particular deference" can be accor ded when the District Court claims to 
have a better insight on the meaning of an or der as the author of that 
order. This is not such a case. 
 
Indeed, I believe that the orders in this case approving class 
certification and approving class notice ar e analogous to consent decrees 
approved by courts, in that they are "hybrid[s] of . . . contract[s] and . 
. . 
court order[s]." Holland v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, Nos. 00-1801, 
2356, 2357, at 20. As this court has just recently held in Holland, the 
appropriate standard of review for such decrees is plenary or de novo 
review, and not the "particular defer ence" review held by the majority. 
Holland, at 21-24. Hence, the majority exer cised an incorrect standard 
of review over the District Court's orders certifying the class and 
approving class notice. 
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My interpretation of "publicly traded" as not including the 
Davidsons' shares is bolstered by the definition of "publicly 
traded" in the Internal Revenue Code Regulations. 
Regulation S 1.170A-13 defines "publicly traded securities" 
as follows: 
 
       In general. Except as provided in paragraph (c)(7)(xi)(C) 
       of this section, the term `publicly traded securities' 
       means securities . . . for which (as of the date of 
       contribution) market quotations are readily available 
       on an established securities market. 
 
I.R.C. Reg. S 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(A). The exceptions section 
states: 
 
       Exception. Securities described in paragraph (c)(7)(xi) 
       (A) or (B) of this section shall not be consider ed 
       publicly traded securities if-- (1) The securities are 
       subject to any restrictions that materially af fect the 
       value of the securities to the donor or pr event the 
       securities from being freely traded .  . . . 
 
I.R.C. Reg. S 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(C)(1) (emphasis added). 
 
The Davidsons' shares precisely fall into this exception, 
in that restrictions were placed on the shares that 
prevented them from being freely traded. Therefore, 
according to the definition of "publicly traded" in the 
Internal Revenue Code Regulations, the Davidsons' shares 
were not "publicly traded." 
 
Moreover, the majority once again tur ns a blind eye to 
the Amended and Consolidated Class Action Complaint 
("ACCAC"), which by its terms supports the Davidsons' 
position that the class action was not intended to cover 
their claims. The ACCAC describes the class members"as 
purchasers on the [NYSE] and acquir ers pursuant to the 
Registration Statement and the Joint Proxy 
Statement/Prospectus [of the merger of CUC and HFS]." 
(App. 156.) In addition, the ACCAC states: 
 
       Lead Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the members of the 
       Class. Plaintiffs and all other members of the Class 
       acquired their CUC common stock pursuant to the 
       Registration Statement and Joint Proxy 
       Statement/Prospectus, and purchased their CUC and 
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       Cendant publicly traded securities on the open market 
       and sustained damages as a result of defendants' 
       wrongful conduct complained of herein. 
 
(App. 156.) These statements make clear that the lead 
plaintiffs intended the class to consist only of purchasers of 
the Cendant shares on the market and pur chasers 
pursuant to the HFS/CUC merger. The Davidsons fall into 
neither of these categories. 
 
In addition, the fact that the claims in the ACCAC for the 
most part differ from the Davidsons' claims against 
Cendant lends still further support to excluding the 
Davidsons from the class. Of the fourteen counts in the 
ACCAC, only five cover the time period during which the 
Davidsons acquired their shares. In addition, as the 
Davidsons point out, the ACCAC alleges claims for violation 
of Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77k, only in 
connection with the HFS/CUC merger. The Davidsons 
would (and did) pursue such claims on their own behalf in 
arbitration, but the ACCAC does not make those claims for 
the Davidsons.15 The ACCAC only intended to cover merger- 
related claims in connection with the HFS/CUC merger and 
further reinforces the point that the CalPERS class did not 
include the Davidsons.16 
 
I therefore disagree with the majority's holding regarding 
the Davidsons' class membership, because I am convinced 
that the District Court clearly erred in finding that the 
Davidsons are within the class. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. In their Notice of Claims for arbitration, the Davidsons made claims 
under SS 11, 12(a)(2), and 17 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77a, et 
seq., S 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b), as 
well as under various sections of the Califor nia Corporations Law and 
common law. The ACCAC also alleges violations of sections 11 and 12 of 
the Securities Act and S 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, but its 
section 11 and section 12 claims are not the same claims that the 
Davidsons have asserted in arbitration, and only theS 10(b) claims in 
the ACCAC arguably cover claims of the Davidsons. 
 
16. See note 4, supra. 
 




I have still another disagreement with the majority 
opinion and its holdings. The majority holds that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in its analysis of 
whether to grant the Davidsons' request for an extension of 
the time to opt out. In considering the Davidsons's request 
for an extension of the opt-out deadline under Rule 6(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court 
described the factors to be considered in connection with 
the excusable neglect standard in detail, citing the Supreme 
Court's decision in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. 
Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 
(1993), and the Third Circuit's earlier opinion concerning 
this standard, Dominic v. Hess Oil V .I. Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 
517 (3d Cir. 1988). See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 194 
F.R.D. 158, 165 (D.N.J. 2000). 
 
However, the District Court in this case, as in other cases 
when it gave only lip service to the Pioneer factors, did not 
comply with the Supreme Court's or our instructions. See 
In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 235 F .3d 176 (3d Cir. 
2000); In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig. , 234 F.3d 166 (3d 
Cir. 2000).17 The District Court here stated only that the 
Davidsons' "alleged failure to receive notice . . . does not 
warrant an extension of the exclusion deadline." 194 F.R.D. 
at 165. It gave as its reasons: class notice was adequately 
published; the case got independent press coverage; "the 
Davidsons' assertion that their failure to opt out is 
excusable because Cendant acted as though they wer e not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. The majority cites another Cendant appeal in which we affirmed the 
District Court's decision that certain plaintif fs' late filing of proofs 
of 
claim was "excusable neglect." (Maj. Op. at 28 (citing In re Cendant Corp. 
PRIDES Litig., 233 F.3d 188 (3d Cir . 2000)).) Because that appeal 
concerned a situation in which the District Court had found excusable 
neglect, it does not particularly illuminate our analysis of the District 
Court's failure to conduct a complete excusable neglect analysis here. 
Moreover, as I note in the text above, at least two other Cendant cases 
have been remanded because the same District Court judge who 
presided over the instant case failed to explain his analysis in those 
cases as well. See In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 235 F.3d 176 (3d 
Cir. 2000); In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 234 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
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class members is not convincing"; and Cendant's"defensive 
maneuvers" in reaction to the Davidsons' arbitration before 
the expiration of the opt-out period "are irrelevant." 194 
F.R.D. at 165. 
 
The District Court said nothing about "the danger of 
prejudice" to Cendant if an extension wer e granted, "the 
length of the delay and its potential impact" on the case, or 
"whether the defendant acted in good faith," Pioneer, 507 
U.S. at 395, nor did the District Court consider"(1) whether 
the inadvertence reflected professional incompetence such 
as ignorance of the rules of procedure, (2) whether an 
asserted inadvertence reflects an easily manufactured 
excuse incapable of verification by the court, and, (3) a 
complete lack of diligence." Dominic, 841 F.2d at 517. 
 
It does not suffice for the majority to attempt tofill in the 
gaping gaps left by the District Court in its aborted Pioneer 
analysis. Nor is the majority's attempt to cur e the 
deficiencies of the District Court's analysis consistent with 
our jurisprudence which requires the District Court to 
explain its excusable neglect reasoning. 
 
When we direct a district court to take a particular 
action, it is not only customary but I suggest it is our 
mandate that the issue or case be retur ned to the district 
court for compliance with our instructions. See, e.g., In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Litig. , 2001 WL 377052, at 5 
(3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2001). It is the district court's discretion 
and findings, not our discretion and findings, that are 
called for in relating the facts found to the principles that 
we have established. Appellate fact finding and"shortcuts" 
taken by an appellate court as the majority has taken here 
are rarely if ever prudential and sage and, unfortunately, 
such fact finding and shortcuts may lead to 
misunderstandings in the case sub judice, to say nothing of 
eroding our established jurisprudence. See Pullman- 
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982) (appellate fact 
finding); Chalfant v. Wilmington Institute, 574 F.2d 739 (3d 
Cir. 1978) (same). We have consistently followed the 
practice of having the district court in the first instance 
determine whether the factors we have established18 meet 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Our cases are legion in which we have set forth factors which are to 
be met and analyzed by evidence in the recor d. See, e.g., Holland v. New 
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evidentiary requirements. Why now in this case has it 
become so necessary to turn our backs on established 
procedures, practices, and our announced jurisprudence by 
usurping the District Court's role? 
 
As we observed in another Cendant appeal:"In the wake 
of Pioneer, we have imposed a duty of explanation on 
District Courts when they conduct `excusable neglect' 
analysis." In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 234 F.3d 166, 
171 (3d Cir. 2000). Indeed, in that case, r egarding 
appellant's motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b) to excuse its late filing of its proof of claim, 
we vacated the District Court's finding that ther e was no 
excusable neglect "because the District Court did not make 
clear its reasoning and application of the`excusable neglect' 
factors," and, therefore, "we do not have a sufficient basis 
to review the District Court's ruling for abuse of discretion." 
234 F.3d at 168. 
 
In yet another Cendant case, also concer ning a party's 
Rule 60(b) motion to allow its late filing of a pr oof of claim, 
we reversed the District Court's finding that there had not 
been excusable neglect, pointing out that "the District 
Court failed to apply properly the standar ds for determining 
`excusable neglect' outlined in Pioneer." In re Cendant Corp. 
PRIDES Litig., 235 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir . 2000). We held 
"that the District Court's misapplication of the Pioneer 
factors in denying Santander's Rule 60(b) motion[was] 
beyond the sound exercise of its discretion." In re Cendant 
Corp. PRIDES Litig., 235 F.3d at 184. 
 
Indeed, in a recent opinion, the author of the majority 
opinion has himself acknowledged our requir ements for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Jersey Dept. of Corrections, Nos. 00-1801, 2356, 2357, at 34-43 (findings 
of fact in connection with enforcement of compliance with consent 
decrees); Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 721 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(awards of attorneys' fees in class actions); Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 
F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2000) (deciding whether to conduct Daubert hearings); 
In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999) (admission of expert 
testimony); United States v. Iannone, 184 F .3d 214 (3d Cir. 
1999)(sentencing decisions in criminal cases); Poulis v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir . 1984) (the dismissal of a complaint). 
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district courts denying parties' "excusable neglect" motions. 
In In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Pr ods. Liab. Litig., Judge 
Ambro observed that "[g]enerally we r equire further 
explanation of an order terminating a litigant's claim." In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 2001 WL 377052, 
at 5 (3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2001). He then asserted that " `[w]e 
have imposed a duty of explanation on District Courts 
when they conduct `excusable neglect' analysis.' " In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 2001 WL 377052, 
at 5 (quoting In re Cendant PRIDES Litig. , 233 F.3d 188, 
196 (3d Cir. 2000)). In light of the majority's apparent 
understanding of what is required of district courts under 
Pioneer, as evidenced by the recent opinion in Orthopedic 
Bone Screw Prods., it is thor oughly perplexing to me that 
the majority fails to hold the District Court to that standard 
and instead takes on the District Court's job itself. 
 
The precedent is clear: the District Court must satisfy its 
duty of explanation. When it does not, the case must be 
remanded for the District Court to do so. This conclusion is 
by no means a "leap of logic" as the majority suggests (Maj. 
Op. at 26-27 n.18); it is the proper and the only application 
of the rule of law in this Circuit. 
 
In re Cendant PRIDES Corp. Litig., 235 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 
2000), relied upon by the majority as support for its own 
consideration of the Pioneer factors, is entirely 
distinguishable. In that case, our court reviewed the 
District Court's denial of a Rule 60(b) "excusable neglect" 
motion for an abuse of discretion. We concluded "that the 
District Court's decision [denying the motion for`excusable 
neglect'] was not consistent with the sound exer cise of its 
discretion." 235 F.3d at 181. Because we held that the 
District Court abused its discretion, we wer e obliged to 
reach the merits of excusable neglect and answer the 
"second question . . . : whether `excusable neglect' excused 
Santander's duty. . . This involves a review of the matter de 
novo, applying the law to the facts." 235 F .3d at 181. 
 
It was only in that procedural posture--reviewing under 
a de novo standard--that we applied the Pioneer factors in 
Cendant PRIDES, 235 F.3d 176. Ther efore, by relying on 
that case, the majority is relying on a case in which we 
exercised de novo review in or der to support its actions in 
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this case where we must exercise abuse of discretion review. 
Such misplaced reliance does not constitute"merely 
following precisely what we did in" Cendant PRIDES, 235 
F.3d 176, as the majority suggests. (Maj. Op. at 26-27 
n.18.) That is, in effect, like saying that it is appropriate to 
reconsider facts already found by a jury because a prior 
appellate court had reviewed de novo a grant of summary 
judgment on a factually similar case. There is simply no 
language strong enough to describe how seriously the 
majority has erred. Its error not only af fects the decision in 
this case, but it also confounds our jurisprudence involving 
our own standards of review. 
 
Indeed, no matter how the majority tries to spin and 
justify its holding here and Judge Ambr o's recent holding in 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods., in derogation of its own 
admonition that "[w]e [should] r efrain from substituting our 
judgment for that of the District Court," see In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Litig. , 2001 WL 377052, at 5, 
it is the majority that has found: that the Davidsons do not 
qualify for the excusable neglect exception because their 
actions caused prejudice to Cendant; that their actions do 
not comport with the good faith requirement; that their 
claims would subject Cendant to additional liabilities; that 
permitting the Davidsons to opt out would deprive Cendant 
of the finality it bargained for; and that the Davidsons 
sought a strategic advantage in not filing a for mal opt-out 
request. (Maj. Op. at 26-29.) These wer e findings that the 
District Court did not make but was obliged to make under 
Pioneer and was then obliged to include in its analysis. Nor 
can I understand why the majority has so blithely undercut 
our directions to the District Court which have now been 
emphasized not just once but at least twice in the Cendant 
cases. See In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 235 F.3d 176 
(3d Cir. 2000); In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 234 F.3d 
166 (3d Cir. 2000); see also In r e Orthopedic Bone Screw 
Prods. Litig., 2001 WL 377052 (3d Cir . Apr. 16, 2001). 
 
We have said, and this majority is bound by our holdings, 
that the District Court must satisfy its "duty of explanation 
. . . when . . . conduct[ing] `excusable neglect' analysis" 
under Pioneer. In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 234 F.3d 
at 171; In re Orthopedic Bone Scr ew Prods. Litig., 2001 WL 
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377052, at 5. The District Court's mere citation of Pioneer 
and recitation of its factors do not satisfy this "duty of 
explanation." Nor, I suggest, does the majority's untoward 
attempt to furnish its own findings and its own 
explanations satisfy the excusable neglect standar d that the 
District Court failed to furnish itself. Now, it may well be 
that, had the District Court considered the Pioneer factors 
explicitly, it still could have reached its same conclusion. 
But that cannot excuse the District Court's flagrant failure 
to comply with this Court's mandate, nor can it excuse the 
majority for attempting to brush this issue under the carpet 




In conclusion, I am more than satisfied that the New 
Jersey District Court egregiously erred in enjoining the 
Davidsons' arbitration. After a review of the statutes and 
case law, there can be no question that the Davidsons' 
claims were properly in arbitration and the California 
Central District Court's decision to that ef fect precluded the 
New Jersey District Court from enjoining the arbitration. 
 
Additionally, I am satisfied that the Davidsons did not fit 
within the class definition because their Cendant shares 
were not "publicly traded securities." Infinding that they 
were, the New Jersey District Court clearly err ed. 
 
Finally, I believe that the New Jersey District Court, in 
failing to comply with the Supreme Court's and our own 
unequivocal directions, again clearly err ed in denying the 
Davidsons' request to extend the opt-out deadline without 
explaining the application of the Pioneer factors as it was 
required to do. 
 
I therefore respectfully dissent, and I would reverse and 
vacate the District Court's order which enjoined an 
arbitration ordered by the Califor nia Central District Court. 
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